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Abstract
This work examines the shift in the Clinton Administration’s Balkans policy from 
the start of the 1992 presidential campaign, when Clinton first articulated an activist 
policy, to May 1993, when he abandoned that policy in favor of a weaker European-led 
plan. With many actors resisting an activist policy for the Balkans, the prospect of a 
failed intervention threatened to derail Clinton’s expansive domestic agenda. Having 
been elected on platform of domestic renewal, Clinton chose the primacy of his domestic 
agenda over a risky Balkans intervention. Helping to fill a void in existing American 
Bosnia policy literature, examining why Clinton abandoned his tough campaign strategy 
allows a better understanding of how the West found itself without an effective policy for 
ending the Balkan war until the 1995 US-sponsored Dayton Peace Accords.
Using a levels of analysis approach to examine the six actors that most influenced 
the shift in the administration’s policy is instructive. Assessing the combined influence 
of these actors, Congress, America’s allies, the media and American public opinion, 
Clinton’s foreign policy triad, the Pentagon, and the office of the president, helps to 
unearth why, without widespread support for intervention and with the prospect that a 
failed policy could derail the administiation’s domestic agenda, Clinton chose to abandon 
the activist "Lift and Strike" policy.
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Introduction
This work will contend that a series of factors, most importantly the stances of 
America’s allies and Congress and the power of American public opinion, combined to 
threaten Bill Clinton’s domestic agenda if  the administration’s “Lift and Strike” strategy 
for ending the conflict in the Balkans failed. In turn, Clinton, who had been elected on a 
platform of domestic renewal, prioritized his domestic agenda over Bosnian peace, and 
withdrew his support for an intervention strategy. This decision represented a distinct 
shift in Clinton’s Bosnia policy, as the activist approach of the 1992 campaign and the 
"Lift and Strike" strategy were abandoned in favor of the European-led “safe areas” 
proposal.
Elected on the strength of his domestic policy platform, Clinton entered office 
having also strongly critiqued President Bush’s muted response to the events in Bosnia.
A primary planlc of Clinton’s foreign policy platform promised Americans a more activist 
policy in Bosnia, but applying such a strategy became extremely complicated once 
Clinton was in office. Only a few months after his inauguration even the president’s 
close aides would admit the naïveté of his campaign-time plans to rescue the Bosnian 
Muslims.^ During the administration’s first months in office, Clinton failed to execute 
his preferred strategy, instead enacting a series of half-measures which were unable to 
end the war.
Following six months of a muddled American Bosnia policy, Clinton returned to 
his campaign-time option of “Lift and Strike,” the plan to lift the arms embargo against 
the Bosnian Muslims and use NATO air power to attack the Bosnian Serbs. But when
 ^ Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton and Foreign Issues: Spasms of Attention,” The New York Times 22 
March 1993: A3.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher failed to gain European support for the strategy, 
Clinton again abandoned it, all but allowing the Europeans a veto over American policy 
on the continent only ten months after criticizing Bush’s lack of leadership in the region. 
Clinton settled on the strategy preferred by the Europeans, the May 1993 Joint Action 
Plan (JAP), even though it was inherently contradictory to the policies his administration 
had articulated during the preceding months. Though Clinton would later describe this 
retreat from leadership as the Europeans “reaffirming” their right to direct the 
international response to the Balkan wars, the shelving of the "Lift and Strike" policy was 
a stark diplomatic failure, and represented a low point for both his foreign policy and its 
legacy in Bosnia.^ Pundits accused Clinton of being unable to lead, and one veteran 
diplomat called the inability to bring the Europeans into line “the end of an era” of 
American leadership in Europe.^
While other works have examined the West’s policy under the weak leadership of 
the European Community (EC), the meandering approach of the Clinton Administration 
and subsequent failure of American leadership between 1993-1995, or the efforts to brealc 
the cycle of Western indifference through the Endgame Strategy and Richard 
Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy and Dayton negotiations, these works often begin with the 
premise that the West was without a strategy for ending the Balkan war until 1995. In 
contrast, this work focuses on the critical six month period at the start of Clinton’s 
presidency, and shows how and why Clinton abandoned a policy which may have ended 
the conflict years earlier, could have displayed the sort of decisive leadership that 
Clinton’s foreign policy critics contended was lacking before 1995, and would have
 ^ William Jefferson Clinton, Mv Life (New York: Random House, 2004) 512.
 ^ For pundits, see Antliony Lewis, “He’s Not Harry Truman,” The New York Times 14 May 1993: A31., 
for diplomat, see Anthony Lewis, “The End of an Era,” The New York Times 24 May 1993: A15.
retained America’s leadership of post-Cold War Europe. Instead, the decision to abandon 
"Lift and Strike" may have set in motion the events which lay the foundation for the 
West’s failed legacy in the Balkans.
To allow for this examination, the “shift” in Clinton’s Bosnia policy must first be 
explained. Chapter 1 shows that during the first months of Clinton’s presidency 
American policy moved on a clear trajectory, away from his 1992 campaign promises 
based on “rolling back” Serbian land gains in Bosnia, and towards the European goal of 
“containing” the conflict. As well, the administration’s rhetorical description of the 
conflict shifted to match the changes in its policy. Campaign-time and early 
administration attempts to characterize the conflict as “aggression” or “genocide,” 
conceptions which would have compelled America to intervene in the Balkans, were 
replaced by suggestions of the uselessness of outside intervention and the hopelessness of 
Bosnian peace, such as Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s portrayal of Bosnia as a 
“civil war” and “a problem from Hell.”"^
A levels of analysis approach will be used to understand the important actors who 
influenced the administration’s policy, and the circumstances that pressured Clinton away 
from “Lift and Strike.” This examination will focus first on the “systemic” level, 
assessing the role of America’s allies. Next, the “domestic” level will focus on four 
primary actors: Clinton’s foreign policy triad (comprised of the secretaries of state and 
defense and the national security advisor), the Pentagon, Congress, and the media and 
American public opinion. Finally, after focusing on the “office of the president,” an 
examination of Clinton’s own policy goals will help to reveal fully how the stances of
Thomas L. Friedman, “Bosnia Reconsidered,” The New York Times 8 April 1993: A l.
these actors and the potential for a "Lift and Strike" failure threatened Clinton’s domestic 
agenda, which he valued over an activist Bosnia policy, leading him to abandon 
intervention. No one actor is responsible for Clinton’s decision, and thus, by using such 
an approach, one is able to understand how many actors combined to influence the ' 
administration’s policy and allow for the domestic agenda to derail Bosnian intervention.
This approach will be aided by the use of many sources, most importantly The 
New York Times. While a variety of books, journals, newspapers, and periodicals were 
consulted during the research phase of this project, due to the vast scope of the topic and 
the variety of newspapers which reported on the conflict, it became necessary to chose 
one source to both create a chronology of events and trace the shift in the 
administration’s policy. Combining excellent reporting on both the conflict itself and 
Clinton’s policy for the region with a reputation for being America’s most superb 
newspaper of record, The New York Times was a logical choice to anchor this research.
As a result, citations from The New York Times are found throughout this work.
Chapter 2 examines the actors at the domestic level. Yugoslavia was key to the 
Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, but after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall lost much of its strategic importance. As a result, both the US and its 
European allies failed to find a national interest in Bosnian intervention. This lack of 
interest would strengthen European resistance to any American strategy which might 
escalate the conflict. While the end of the Cold War also refocused European energies on 
domestic policies, a successfully negotiated peace in Yugoslavia would have allowed the 
EC an improved image after its failure to create a united front over the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. With the prospect o f common European foreign policies, came the possibility for
deeper integration. Yet while the EC volunteered to talce the early lead in peace 
negotiations, the European principles soon divided over policy. Once Germany opted to 
unilaterally recognize two brealcaway Yugoslav republics, and in turn Bosnia, the EC, in 
the interest of maintaining unity, found itself forced to follow suit. But, while support for 
the republics in their military struggle against the Serbs was strong in Germany, France 
and Britain failed to see a compelling national interest in supporting any Balkan nation, 
and preferred instead to find a quick end to the conflict. While Germany remained a 
strong supporter of the Bosnians, its constitution forbade it to use military force in the 
Balkans. Thus, with the EC taking the lead in the Balkan peace negotiations, and 
Germany unable to undertake militaiy action, it fell to Britain and France to send in 
peacekeepers to protect Bosnia’s civilians and the relief effort. As a result, the nation 
which most broadly supported Bosnia, Germany, did not have any means of saving it 
from Serbian aggression, while the nations which wished the fighting to end as soon as 
possible, Britain and France, had thousands of troops on the ground in the form of the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The safety of these UNPROFOR troops 
became the primary stumbling block to the Clinton Administration’s “Lift and Strike” 
proposal. Each suggestion to lift the embargo or bomb the Serbs brouglit adamant 
objections from the British and French, who feared Serbian reprisals against their soldiers 
and opposed any policy which would “level the killing field” and prolong the war.^ The 
price for “Lift and Strike” was clear: immediate evacuation of all UNPROFOR troops, 
and consequently, America’s inheritance of the role as unitary peacekeeper in Bosnia. 
This “UNPROFOR Dilemma” would create too high a price for intervention, and be
 ^ Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. (London: Penguin Books, 2001) 
49.
instrumental in shifting the administration’s policy.
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of the various domestic actors who influenced the 
administration’s policy. The first section will examine Clinton’s foreign policy advisers. 
As a group, the effectiveness of the foreign policy triad was fatally weakened by the 
president’s inattention to international policy, and as a result the triad failed to convince 
Clinton o f the need to implement an activist policy for Bosnia. His advisers also failed to 
create strong policy in their individual capacities. Two of the advisers. Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, were poor choices for their 
positions, and the third, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, lacked the support 
jfrom Clinton necessary to undertake the sweeping overhaul of American foreign policy 
required in a post-Cold War world, and thus he was marginalized. The administration 
lacked a persuasive advocate for “Lift and Strike” during Christopher’s disastrous May 
1993 negotiations with the Europeans; remained on poor terms with the Pentagon from 
the earliest moments of Clinton’s presidency; and without a post-Cold War foreign policy 
blueprint, failed to place Bosnian peace in the context of American national interest. 
Furthermore, Clinton ignored the foreign policy process, and the deteriorating situation in 
Bosnia, preferring instead to delegate foreign policymaking to his advisers. However, his 
poorly constituted foreign policy team required the sort of involvement in the 
policymaking process their president was unwilling to give. Thus, the triad’s 
inappropriate composition, combined with the president’s lack of attention to foreign 
policy, practically paralyzed the triad as an efficient policy making unit.
For both cultural and policy reasons, Clinton’s relationship with the Pentagon was 
strained firom his presidency’s earliest days, and while it will not be suggested that this
conflict single-handedly derailed the administration’s preferred policy, it is possible that 
such a poor politico-military relationship empowered soldiers already predisposed to 
resist “Lift and Strike” to remain firm in their opposition while advising the president and 
Congress. Even while certain soldiers seemed optimistic about the probability for a 
successful airpower intervention, the majority resistance to "Lift and Strike" made 
Congressional leaders cautious in their support; the debate over the usefulness of 
airstrikes tended to follow traditional intra-military rivalries, and most legislators were 
unwilling to support the policy unless they had overwhelming Pentagon backing. The 
standard bearer of the “Lift and Strike” resistance was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Colin Powell, who, though eventually co-opted into approving a watered-down 
version, injected much doubt into the minds of Congressional leaders, the administration, 
and the public as to the policy’s efficacy. His cautious attitude stemmed from the first of 
three “Vietnam Syndromes,” the “Pentagon Strain,” which argued against the use of force 
without well-defined military and political objectives, a stance articulated in the Powell 
Doctrine. Beyond Powell’s distaste for poorly-defined interventions, his dislike towards 
Clinton and weak comprehension of the events in Yugoslavia further weakened this 
advisory relationship.
Strong Pentagon opposition emboldened the many anti-interventionists in 
Congress, for while much of the Congressional leadership supported or even demanded 
intervention, the ranlc-and-file were either cautious about or hostile to engagement. 
Though presidents traditionally dominate foreign policy formulation, the political climate 
had Clinton reeling from a series of lost battles on Capitol Hill, and his ability to 
influence Congress, even in the traditionally executive-dominated foreign policy arena.
seemed minimal. These recent defeats did not bode well for upcoming struggles over the 
budget, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or health care, each of 
which were important planlcs of Clinton’s domestic platfonn.^ The lack of widespread 
support suggested that Clinton would have had to spend political capital to gain 
Congressional approval for an inteiwention, and that a failed policy would attract 
retaliation against his domestic agenda. Due to the unique three-way race for the 
presidency in 1992, Congressional Democrats had not been swept to power on Clinton’s 
coattails, and their lack of indebtedness to him eroded party discipline on Capitol Hill. 
Thus gaining Congressional support for “Lift and Strike” would have necessitated a great 
deal of coaxing, even inside his own party, further reducing the reservoir o f political 
capital Clinton needed to implement his domestic policy agenda. When Clinton returned 
to “Lift and Strike” in May 1993 Congress granted its conditional support, but the 
message from Congressional leaders was clear, raising even further the stakes for 
intervention: once engaged, even under the cover of a multinational force, the world’s 
only superpower could not be allowed to fail.^ This warning represented the 
“Congressional Strain” of the “Vietnam Syndrome,” and aimed to discourage foreign 
military action which could damage the international and military credibility of the 
United States. It raised the stakes for intervention, contributing to Clinton’s decision to 
abandon "Lift and Strike.”
The media and American public opinion also influenced Clinton. Media coverage 
of the Bosnian war played a crucial role in the formulation of the “Lift and Strike” policy. 
When reporting by Roy Gutman of Newsday and the British ITN camera team exposed
 ^ While NAFTA was a foreign economic agreement, as improving the economy was a domestic policy 
goal, NAFTA can be seen as a domestic policy.
 ^ Elaine Sciolino, “Clinton on Serbs: Pacing Shalcy Ground,” The New York Times 1 May 1993: A6.
the Serbs’ detention centers to shocked audiences around the world, the reaction by the 
Bush Administration was muted.^ Locked in a desperate campaign for reelection, and 
under fierce criticism that he had focused on foreign policy at the expense of domestic 
policy, Bush could not afford another international engagement. To avoid calls for 
intervention, the Bush Administration denied first the existence, and later the severity, of 
the Serb camps. This opened the door for candidate Clinton, who was searching to find a 
foreign policy issue with which to distinguish himself from Bush, to make the activist 
promises which would raise expectations across the globe that, if  elected, Clinton would 
take action against the Serbs. The media, much of which was disgusted with Bush’s 
reaction, received Clinton’s pronouncements with great fanfare, repeating them often, 
and setting high expectations for an activist intervention into the Balkans following 
Clinton’s inauguration. It was Clinton’s desire to combat Bush through the airwaves 
which laid the early foundations for the policy crisis in which he found himself by May 
1993.
The media also contributed to the formulation of the world’s conception of the 
Bosnia conflict, in turn influencing the aforementioned actors as each formed their own 
stances on the war and considered what American policy for the region should be. 
Though often acting with the goal of objectivity in mind, biases among news 
organizations, the simplification of complicated concepts for easy digestion in a short 
article or evening news story, reliance on “experts” to explain events, and the granting of 
an audience to representatives fi*om each ethnic group combined to cloud the
 ^ Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Kelt: Understanding Bosnia’s War (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 118., 
Warren P. Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) 147.
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understanding of the conflict. The media tendency towards oversimplification and 
“groupthink,” combined with the granting of ample airtime and ink to indicted war 
criminals such as Radovan Karadzic, muddied the waters, creating doubt for much of the 
world as to the true nature of the conflict. This directly caused many people to reject 
intervention on the grounds that the conflict was the result of “ancient hatreds” as 
opposed to modem Serbian aggression. This could have affected the stance of Congress 
on intervention, the Pentagon on the intractable nature of the Bosnian “tar baby,” and the 
public’s resistance towards unilateral action.
While the public tended to support the use of force against the Serbs, it did so 
only under the banner of multilateralism, in concert with the EC. Once the possibility 
arose for unilateral American action in the Balkans, public support declined dramatically, 
all but eliminating the possibility o f such action. When the British and French threatened 
withdrawal of their forces fiom Bosnia if  the US lifted the embargo and attacked the 
Serbs (in effect bequeathing responsibility for Bosnia to the United States alone) the 
specter of a public unsupportive of a unilateral intervention made “Lift and Strike” 
untenable.
Chapter 4 examines the office of the president and shows how the combination of 
Clinton’s domestic policy goals and the stances of the other actors studied led to the 
decision to abandon “Lift and Strike.” While a levels of analysis approach often uses the 
most finitely focused examination, that of the “individual” level, to examine how the 
personality, psychology, and idiosyncrasies of a particular actor influence policy, this 
work knowingly follows a different path. While every presidential policy decision is 
partly influenced by the personality and belief structure of the man occupying the office,
11
examining those influences would not greatly aid the goal of understanding Clinton’s 
Bosnia policy. The decision to abandon "Lift and Strike" came after weighing the 
possibility that a failed intervention in the Balkans could derail the domestic policy 
agenda. Thus, understanding that decision necessitates not an examination of the 
personality or psychology of Clinton’s leadership, but of his domestic policy goals and 
his initial motivation for taking a strong stance on the Bosnia issue. This chapter takes 
this approach and ties together the stances of the other actors examined to show how they 
combined to derail “Lift and Strike.”
During this examination of the office of the president, it will be shown that the 
original formulation of the "Lift and Strike" policy was the result of overheated campaign 
rhetoric. This reduced Clinton’s commitment to intervention once in office, especially 
after the costs of a failed policy had been made clear. Furthermore, the “Clinton Strain” 
of the “Vietnam Syndrome” contributed to his decision. For Clinton, Vietnam evoked 
memories of Lyndon B. Johnson’s derailed domestic agenda and tarnished reputation, 
and the risks for Democratic reformers engaging in expansive foreign engagements. The 
examination of Clinton’s role in derailing the policy shows how the stances of the 
aforementioned actors combined to convince him that a failed intervention in the Balkans 
would put his domestic policy in grave danger. Considering the importance of his 
domestic agenda to his administration’s goals and his perceived mandate, he chose to 
prioritize his domestic policy over a risky Balkans intervention.
As no factor can be given sole responsibility for derailing the "Lift and Strike" 
policy, this work shows how the combination o f several factors worked together to 
produce this result. The most powerful pressure against intervention came from
12
Clinton’s dedication to his domestic agenda; the other actors only influenced policy in an 
indirect manner. While the allies, the American public, and Congress would have the 
greatest indirect impact on halting intervention, these actors did not directly act to restrain 
Clinton’s hand. Instead, their stances made clear that a failure in the Balkans threatened 
Clinton’s domestic agenda. Since the activist Bosnia policy had been formulated to sei*ve 
the ends o f a challenging presidential campaign, Clinton did not prioritize his Balkans 
stance over his domestic proposals. Wedded to an expansive domestic agenda, Clinton 
opted not to risk his policy goals in order to execute an intervention in the Balkans that 
many predicted would fail. He chose instead to shelve the "Lift and Strike" policy, and 
follow the weak lead of the EC.
13
Chapter 1: Tracing the Shift
The 1992 Presidential Campaign (October 1991 - January 1993)
Any focus on Clinton’s Bosnia policy must begin with the 1992 presidential 
campaign. Clinton’s campaign-time criticism of the Bush Administration’s foreign 
policy record, most specifically its record in the Balkans, set the tone for high 
expectations of an activist Bosnia policy once Clinton reached office. Clinton was aware 
that some scoffed at his foreign policy credentials, so to defeat a Republican president 
with a strong foreign policy record he needed to show his capacity in the international 
arena, prove that he was not a “dove” unwilling to commit troops to combat, and to 
reveal wealcnesses in Bush’s foreign policies, thus undermining his opponent’s major 
area of strength.
This opportunity came in August 1992 following the discovery that the Bosnian 
Serbs were holding Bosnian Muslim men in detention centers, in situations reminiscent 
of the Holocaust. When the Bush Administration both denied the existence of the centers 
and refiised to characterize such Serbian activity as “genocidal,” an admission which 
under international treaty would have compelled American intervention, Clinton attacked 
Bush’s Bosnia policy.^
“If the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining 
silent and paralyzed in the face of genocide. We must discover who is responsible for 
these actions and take steps to bring them to justice for these crimes against humanity,”
 ^ Richard Johnson, “The Pinstripe Approach to Genocide,” in Stjepan G. Mestrovié (éd.), The Conceit of 
Innocence: Losing the Conscience of the West in the War against Bosnia. (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1997) 65.
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suggested Clinton/^ Clinton claimed that George Bush had failed to show “real 
leadership” in a region where events had been tantamount to genocide, and that instead of 
ignoring the fighting in the Balkans, the US should be prepared to talce a lead role in 
bringing peace to the Bosnia/^ Clinton made it clear that if  elected, he would be willing 
to commit forces to a multilateral operation to “shoot its way in” to the Sarajevo airport 
to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the beleaguered city, and would later state that 
he believed the US should use military force to open the Serbian detention camps In 
addition, levied onto the entire former Yugoslavia but particularly detrimental to the 
Bosnian Muslims, should be tightened against the Bosnian Serbs but lifted for the 
Bosnians/^ Clinton also asserted that not only should the Bosnian Muslims be allowed 
to purchase weapons to defend themselves, allied air power should be used against the 
Serbs in the interim between the lifting o f the embargo and the delivery of arms/"^
Clinton’s rhetoric and proposals marked a radical departure jfrom Bush’s hands- 
off Balkans approach. However, Clinton would not enact his campaign-time strategies 
once elected, and at no later time would his proposals for ending the war in the Balkans 
be as activist and certain as they were during the campaign. During this period Clinton’s 
conception of the war and America’s strategies for intervening seemed clear: the Serbs 
were the aggressors, the Bosnians the victims, and the need for American military 
intervention, at least to assure the safe delivery of aid to the region, was desperate.
10 Clifford Krauss, “US Baclcs Away from Charge o f Atrocities,” The New York Times 5 August 1992: 
A12.
For Bush critique, see Andrew Rosenthal, “Clinton Attacked on Foreign Policy,” The New York Times 
27 July 1992: A l., For “tantamount to genocide” comment, see Krauss, “US Baclcs Away,” 5 August 1992.
For Sarajevo ahport, see R.W. Apple Jr., B. Drummond Ayers Jr., Thomas L. Friedman, Steven 
Greenhouse, and Gwen Ifill (Interviewers), “Excerpts from Interview with Clinton on Goals for 
Presidency,” The New York Times 28 June 1992: A17., For detention camps, see Gwen Ifill, “Clinton 
Takes Aggressive Stance on Role of US in Bosnia Conflict,” The New York Times 10 August 1992: A8. 
Ifill, “Clinton Takes Aggressive Stance,” 10 August 1992,
Ifill, “Clinton Takes Aggressive Stance,” 10 August 1992.
15
The Administration’s Early Days (January 21 - February 9,1993)
Clinton’s difficulty with enacting the policies articulated during the campaign 
were reflected by his administration’s stance on Bosnia once in office. Following his 
inauguration, the administration seemed to reject its military options after confronting the 
complexities of the Balkan conflict and the actual prospect of ordering a foreign military 
intervention with the American public so preoccupied with domestic issues. In the first 
of several contradictory stances, Clinton attributed the decision not to intervene 
immediately on the Balkan parties having stepped up peace negotiations in the form of 
the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), but simultaneously declined to grant the plan full 
American backing or pressure the Muslims to sign it.^  ^ “Our reluctance on the VOPP.., 
is that the US at the present is reluctant to impose an agreement on the parties to which 
they do not agree, especially when the Bosnian Muslims might be left at a severe 
disadvantage if the agreement is not undertaken in good faith by the other parties and 
cannot be enforced extemally.”^^  Thus, while the administration declined to intervene 
militarily in support of the VOPP, it also refused to endorse the plan, fearing it ratified 
“ethnic cleansing,” nor would it pressure the Muslims into accepting the compromise 
solution put forward by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. While there is no evidence of a 
change in Clinton’s conception of the conflict, which saw Serbs as aggressors, Muslims 
as victims, and the events in Bosnia as tantamount to genocide, his preferred policy had
Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Seeking Negotiated Path to Bosnia Pact,” The New York Times 5 
February 1993: A l.
Friedman, “Clinton Seeldng Negotiated Path,” 5 February 1993.
Gwen Ifill, “Clinton and Mulroney Fault Balkan Peace Plan,” The New York Times 6 February 1993: 
A3.
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already begun to alter. Only weeks into his presidency Clinton had begun a retreat from 
his interventionist campaign strategy, ostensibly to allow for the success of a plan he did 
not support. However, perhaps recognizing this, Clinton asked the American public to be 
patient and wait for his administration to present its own policy, to follow shortly.
Clinton’s First Bosnia Proposal (February 10 - February 20,1993)
The administration proposal was revealed at a February 10* press conference 
featuring Warren Christopher. After only three weeks in office Clinton abandoned both 
his interventionist campaign rhetoric and early criticisms of the VOPP by presenting a 
remarkably similar proposal. Unable to create a sufficient alternative to the joint United 
Nations / European Community plan, Clinton chose instead to throw his weight behind 
the efforts of Vance and Owen, all but embracing the fundamental tenets of an agreement 
many in the administration felt rewarded Serbian “ethnic cleansing.” As well, to the 
Europeans’ relief, the tough military threats of the 1992 campaign were noticeably absent 
from Clinton’s new plan. With no mention of lifting the arms embargo or using force 
against the Serbs, it was clear that the administration now favored the diplomatic route 
and had eschewed its military options. However, Clinton had also signaled a new level 
of investment in the pursuit of Balkan peace by promising troops to the region following 
the establishment o f a lasting peace agreement, and by dispatching his personal envoy, 
Reginald Bartholomew, to assist in the talks.
Yet while there was now heightened American involvement in the region,
During a TV question and answer session, Clinton declares that the US must be “much stronger in 
standing up to aggression,” suggesting that his conception of the conflict in Bosnia still portrays the Serbs 
as attackers and the Muslims as victims. “Excerpts from Clinton’s Questions-and-Answer Session on TV,” 
The New York Times 11 February 1993: A26.
Ifill, “Clinton and Mulroney,” 6 February 1993.
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Clinton’s new proposal was also effectively weaker than the VOPP; the agreement the 
administration had originally claimed not stringent enough. While the VOPP threatened 
the use of force to push the parties towards peace, the American version refused to 
support any agreement to which the parties did not freely consent. Thus while this new 
proposal joined America and Europe as full partners in the push for peace and signaled 
America’s continuing support for the Bosnian cause, it also ostensibly freed America 
from responsibility for it, as Clinton’s version called for the deployment of American 
troops only for peacekeeping, in the case of a lasting peace. By neglecting to promise the 
deployment of American forces to separate the warring parties, Clinton had removed the 
VOPP’s strongest “stick.” By promising not to support any agreement to which the 
parties did not freely consent, he also revealed an inlierent contradiction in American 
policy: While the US was now committed to bringing peace in the region, it refused to 
either threaten the Serbs with force or to pressure the Muslims into signing an agreement 
which recognized the results of Serbian “ethnic cleansing,” one or both of which would 
be necessary to end the fighting. While the administration’s policy had softened, its 
rhetoric towards the Serbs had not. Though no threats of intervention in Bosnia were 
made, there was still a noticeable mismatch between Christopher’s words and the 
administration’s policy announcement.^®
The secretary of state’s words were powerful: “Bold tyi*ants and fearful minorities 
are watching to see whether ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a policy the world will tolerate... (Our) 
answer must be a resounding ‘no’.”^^  The administration continued to favor the Muslim
Ivo Daalder, Getting to Davton: The Maldng of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000) 10.
“Christopher’s Remaries on Balkans: ‘Crucial Test’ - NYT - Excerpts from Warren Christopher’s news 
conference,” 11 February 1993: A12.
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cause, labeling the Serbs’ action as “aggression” and considering the conflict 
“international” in nature, causing many in Sarajevo to believe that intervention remained 
just over the horizon.^^ However, in the first signs that the campaign-time policy was 
becoming untenable, the administration’s threats would not match the boldness of its 
words: the only mention of military action emphasized the limits of American activism in 
the region.
Air Lifts (late February - early March 1993)
The prospects of peace through the VOPP quickly stalled. While greater 
American pressure on the Muslims or the threat o f military action against the Serbs may 
have forced a breakthrough in the peace process, the administration instead searched for 
ways to relieve the suffering of Bosnia’s civilians and retain international credibility. 
Facing a cautious Pentagon and a wary public, Clinton continued to avoid military 
options, opting instead for a series o f high-profile airlifts designed to deliver much- 
needed supplies to beleaguered civilians in various Muslim, Croat, and Serbian enclaves.
Yet while the airlifts were lauded by some as a sign of the administration’s 
continually expanding involvement in the region, American officials privately 
aclaiowledged that the new policy was mostly a symbolic gesture.^^ Unwilling to put 
American pilots in hann’s way, Clinton instructed the planes to remain above 10,000 
feet, well out of the reach of Serbian anti-aircraft weaponry, but also greatly decreasing 
the prospect that the aid would reach its intended target. Though the airlifts seemed to 
alleviate some of the pressure on Clinton to do more for Balkan peace than his
“Exceqjts from Clinton Question-and-Answer Session on TV,” 11 February 1993: A26.
Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Announces Airdrops to Bosnia will Begin Shortly,” The New York 
Times 26 February 1993: A l.
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predecessor had done, they also revealed how far the administration’s policy had already 
strayed from the tough rhetoric of the 1992 campaign. While only months earlier Clinton 
had seemed willing to risk American lives to open the airport in Sarajevo, he now seemed 
cautious in even suggesting that the airlifts would pose any significant danger to the 
pilots involved. Instead, he stressed that the airlifts would be “quite limited” (in number) 
and that “the risk (to the pilots would) not be appreciably more than training flights.” "^^
As well, the White House was careful to couch the operation in humanitarian terms, 
cautioning that the airlifts did not necessarily signal a greater military involvement in 
Bosnia.^^
While the airlifts may have seemed to signify the administration’s increasing 
involvement in the region, the humanitarian focus of the operation was far from the bold 
promises of military intervention made during the campaign, as were the cautious and 
limited means in which the administration was willing to deliver to the aid. Instead of 
signifying increased involvement in Bosnia, this new policy began to reveal the 
limitations of American policy in the region.^^ That the airlifts came partly in response to 
the stalled VOPP negotiations best represent this: instead of redoubling its efforts for a 
breakthiough at the negotiating table, the administration did nothing to further the talks, 
instead engaging in a controversial and largely ineffective relief effort. It had become 
clear that while the administration wished to be seen as remaining engaged, there were 
many limits to the effort it would undertake to bring peace to Bosnia.
For limiting number of flights, see Friedman, 26 February 1993. For risk to pilots, see Thomas L. 
Friedman, “Airdrop Proposal Gets Endorsement o f the UN Chief,” The New York Times 24 February 
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Shifting Back to Tough Talk (early M arch - Early May)
The contradictions between America’s reluctance either to persuade the Bosnians 
to sign the VOPP or threaten the Bosnian Serbs with military intervention created a 
policy crossroads in the spring of 1993. When the Bosnian Muslims surprised the world 
on March 26,1993 and approved the VO map, making peace seem more possible than 
ever, Clinton returned to tough rhetoric to compel the Bosnian Serbs to approve the treaty 
as well. In an interview with CBS television, he indicated that if the Bosnians and 
Croatians signed the peace plan but the Serbs refused, “ ... we thinlc we’re going to have to 
look at some other actions to try to give the Bosnians the means to at least defend 
themselves.”^^  Six days later the Bosnian Serb parliament refused to approve the plan, 
forcing Clinton to reexamine American policy.
This period of policy formulation, eventually leading the administration to 
propose “Lift and Strike” to the Europeans, was the most instructive for examining the 
competing factors in the creation of the administration’s Bosnia policy. Clinton found 
himself tom by the paradox of trying to end the war in Bosnia without rewarding Serbian 
aggression, and burdened with the task o f creating a policy supported by Congress and 
the public that neither divided the NATO alliance nor destabilized Boris Yeltsin’s 
government.^^ With pressure from both domestic and foreign factions to follow various 
courses, the unsure and oft-changing nature of the president’s Bosnia policy had never 
seemed to uncertain.
Clinton’s actions and rhetoric, as well as those of his close advisers, reflected this 
uncertainty. In the span of a few weeks, not only did the president and his top advisers
^ Steven A. Holmes, “US Presses Serbs by Hinting at End of Arms Embargo on Bosnia,” The New York 
Times 26 March 1993: A13.
Paul Lewis, “US Postpones Enforcing Ban on Serb Flights,” The New York Times 25 March 1993: A3.
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publicly contradict each other as to the military options being considered, but for the first 
time the administration began to voice varying rhetorical descriptions of the conflict. The 
president and key officials began describing Bosnia less as a test case for America’s role 
in preserving the post-Cold War order and nurturing democracy and more as an 
intractable “problem from hell” about which very little could be done.^^ Later during this 
period the president’s description of the war swung from attempted genocide to that of an 
ancient tribal feud, and back to a conception of Bosnia as a “Holocaust to the nth 
degree.” ®^ A few days earlier he had been quoted as saying, “The US should always take 
an opportunity to stand up against -  at least speak out against -  inhumanity.”  ^^ That 
single sentence illustrates the two policies between which Clinton could not choose.
Even a benign interpretation of the administration’s inconsistencies could not obscure 
this record of indecision.^^ Clinton would finally decide to by revive his most 
controversial policy: lift the aims embargo on the Bosnians and bomb the Serbs until the 
weapons reached the Bosnian troops. He then dispatched Warren Christopher to several 
European capitals to gain the Europeans’ support for the strategy.
Changing the Europeans: “Lift and Strike” (early May - May 22,1993)
Christopher’s trip to Europe is significant not only because it represents perhaps 
the biggest diplomatic failure of Clinton’s entire presidency, but because it signaled the 
definitive collapse o f the president’s hopes to translate his tough campaign rhetoric on
Friedman, “Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy,” 8 April 1993,
For Clinton’s conception of the conflict as representing “genocide,” see Clifford Krauss, “US Backs 
Away,” 5 August 1992. For tribal feud, see Thomas L, Friedman, “Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy,” 8 
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Bosnia into policy. Not only did the trip spell the death of “Lift and Strike” as a realistic 
measure for bringing an end to the Bosnian war, but it left America without a strategy 
capable of achieving its goal of rolling back the Bosnian Serbs’ gains of the previous 
year. With no alternative policy to return land to the Muslims, Clinton altered both his 
conception of the conflict and subsequent policy goals allow the administration to support 
the European “safe areas” proposal, a plan he had previously shunned for ratifying 
Serbian “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia.
On May 22, 1993, a ceremony took place on the White House lawn which 
signaled an unceremonious end to the "Lift and Strike.” With it, the JAP became the 
world’s best hope at halting Serbian aggression in Bosnia. American policy would no 
longer seek to create a level playing field between the Muslims and Serbs by arming the 
Bosnians, nor would it attempt to roll back the Serbs’ gains. Instead, containing the 
conflict had now become Clinton’s primary goal.^^ To justify this shift in objectives, the 
administration also altered its rhetorical description of the war in Bosnia by ceasing to 
portray the Muslims as victims and the Serbs as aggressors, quite contradictory to any 
previous administration statement blaming the Serbs for its campaign of “ethnic 
cleansing.” '^^  Just as Clinton had sharpened his description of the war to score points 
against Bush during the campaign, the definition o f the war would be changed again to 
malce the administration’s policy acceptable to the American people.^^ While 
intervention had once been seen as a moral imperative, Bosnia would now be portrayed 
as an amoral mess.^^
Sciolino, “US Goal on Bosnia,” 19 May 1993.
Sciolino, “US Goal on Bosnia,” 19 May 1993.
Bert. Reluctant. 105.
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While earlier that month the president had characterized the conflict as 
“international” in nature, Christopher now suggested to members of the House Foreign 
Relations Committee that the war was an internal conflict, calling Bosnia a “morass” of 
deep distrust and ancient hatreds among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, and argued that 
“there are atrocities on all sides.”^^  As well, the administration not only stopped 
comparing events in Bosnia to the Holocaust, it went to great lengths to explain the 
differences between the two cases. Once, during a heated Congressional hearing, 
Christopher explained, “It’s somewhat different than the Holocaust. It’s easy to 
analogize this to the Holocaust, but I never heard o f any genocide by the Jews against the 
German people.”^^  In fact, prior to testifying, Christopher had sent urgent requests for 
State Department experts to provide him with evidence of Muslim atrocities against 
Serbs.^^ This request ignored the fact that while atrocities had been committed on all 
sides, genocide had not."^  ^ Finally, by concluding his testimony with the statement that, 
“(a)t heart, this is a European problem,” the administration may have been trying to 
rationalize its decision to neglect America’s traditional role as the primary architect o f 
Europe’s security policy, allowing instead for the Europeans to set the agenda through the 
“safe areas” proposal."^' The administration’s conception of the conflict and subsequent 
policy objectives had altered fundamentally, but were now consistent in its new policy.
Once Clinton announced the death of “Lift and Strike” and endorsed the “safe
areas” plan, America’s presumption o f post-Cold War leadership in Europe, something
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the important European powers still desired and even required, was greatly eroded. This 
both stripped the NATO alliance of its traditional leader, reducing the organization’s 
clout in Balkan peacemaking during the subsequent months and years, and revived 
questions about the administration’s ability to conduct a strong foreign policy. In less 
than six months, Clinton had not only failed to implement his prefened policy to stop the 
fighting, but he had also completely recreated his conception of the conflict and 
subsequent policy objectives to fit a policy with which he fundamentally disagreed. 
Indeed, firom the heady days of the 1992 campaign to late May 1993 there had been a 
truly fundamental shift of Clinton’s policy for Bosnia and the conceptions which inspired 
it. The following sections explain how particular actors contributed to this shift.
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Chapter 2 — The Systemic Level
Americans Allies and Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Dilemma 
This section will explain how the EC’s reaction to Yugoslavia’s dissolution 
created a dilemma in which the international community’s primary vehicle for 
maintaining and asserting Balkan peace, UNPROFOR, also became the greatest obstacle 
to enacting Clinton’s "Lift and Strike" p o l i c y O f  the actors who influenced Clinton’s 
decision to abandon the "Lift and Strike" policy in May 1993, none played more of a role 
than the leading states of the EC, Britain, France, and Germany. Understanding the EC’s 
approach to Bosnian recognition, and in turn the motivation behind the deployment of 
UNPROFOR, helps explain how America’s allies so greatly slowed the Clinton 
Administration push towards intervention. Without a discernible national interest in 
forcing a Yugoslav peace, neither the US nor the EC were willing to use force to stop the 
burgeoning conflict during 1992. However, in order to maintain the appearance of a 
united European foreign policy, Britain and France supported the German decision to 
recognize the brealcaway republics o f Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia with the deployment 
of the UNPROFOR to protect the delivery of relief supplies to the region. In turn, partly 
due to differing perceptions of the conflict, when the US threatened military action 
against the Serbs to force the parties to the negotiating table, the safety of the British and 
French UNPROFOR troops, as well as the non-participation of American ground troops 
in the relief effort, became the primary European argument against supporting an 
American use of force. A military intervention would result in the withdrawal of the
While the EC consisted of twelve members during this period, the term “EC” should be understood to 
refer to the EC’s most indispensable nations on the Bosnia issue: Britain, France, and Germany.
26
UNPROFOR, leaving the US with sole responsibility for bringing peace to the region. 
The prospect o f such a foreign policy responsibility did not seem in the best interests of 
either the US or the Clinton Administration, and would play a large role in derailing the 
push towards intervention. Thus, as the safety of the European UNPROFOR troops was 
an important blockade to American intervention, examining the EC decision to first 
recognize and then deploy peacekeeping troops to Bosnia is essential for understanding 
why it resisted America’s efforts to lift the arms embargo and use air power against the 
Serbs.
Yugoslavia and the National Interest
That’s a tragic, tragic situation in Bosnia, make no mistake about that. It’s the
world’s most difficult diplomatic problem I believe. It defies any simple solution.
The United States is doing all that it can consistent with our national interest.
- Secretary of State Warren Christopher"^^
During the Cold War, a civil war in Yugoslavia could have posed a serious threat 
to international peace and security. Located at both the geographical and ideological 
fault line between the West and the Soviet bloc, total influence over Yugoslavia long 
remained an unattainable prize for champions of both democracy and communism. Thus, 
for decades Soviet and Western leaders would have viewed it in their “vital” national 
interests to influence the outcome of a Balkan conflict, possibly spending considerable 
blood and treasure to do so.^  ^ However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold 
War’s blocs became superfluous, and many previously important alliances lost their 
purpose, leading to a kind of indifference to many global developments on the part of the
July 21,1993, as quoted in Power, A Problem From Hell. 310, 
Bert. Reluctant. 5.
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United States and its allies. Their diminished interest in Yugoslavia fits this pattern 
well.'*’
When Yugoslavia began sliding into decay in mid-1991, neither the US nor its 
European allies rushed to intervene militarily to stabilize the region. “We don’t have a 
dog in this fight,” Bush Administration Secretary of State James Baker would say of the 
conflict."^  ^ Important leaders on both sides of the Atlantic had come to the consensus 
during 1991-1992 that the Yugoslav conflict did not impinge on their nations’ “vital” 
security interests, with a Balkan conflict stability no longer representing the threat to 
European stability it might have during the Cold War. It would no longer be worthy of 
the expenditure of blood or treasure to force peace onto the region.
However, these leaders failed to see that the conflict in Yugoslavia threatened to 
disturb the burgeoning norms of the post-Cold War order, and thus represented a “vital” 
systemic interest for all of the nations involved."^  ^ Disintegration and ethnic conflict 
within an internationally recognized state such as Bosnia challenged various established 
laws and precedents of international state behavior, threatening to further destabilize 
several building blocks of an international system already in great flux."^  ^ Furthermore, 
the Bosnian Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing threatened the fledgling international 
commitment to universal human rights norms. However, Western governments have 
raiely intervened exclusively in the defense of a humanitarian agenda, although 
interventions for other purposes have often been decorated with the language o f 
“humanitarianism,” such as in the UN’s response, designed to protect economic self
Bert. Reluctant. 4.
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interest, to the invasion of Kuwait, or the American intervention into Nicaragua in pursuit 
of Cold War goals. It seemed, however, that an intervention to save thousands of Muslim 
lives was beyond the scope of a “humanitarian” intervention."*^
Thus, as the case of Bosnia illustrates, there are few places or ideals that nations 
deem critical enough to national security to unilaterally defend militarily.^® On both sides 
of the Atlantic, the end of the superpower rivalry ushered in a period of changed 
priorities, with citizens expecting their leaders to focus their energies on revitalizing 
sluggish economies and domestic renewal, and leaders welcoming this change to 
concentrate on domestic policy agendas which paid high dividends from voters. These 
domestic priorities were simply more important to the individual NATO states than the 
conflict in the Balkans, and European leaders were saddled with the additional challenge 
o f gaining popular support from a wary public for the movement towards European 
integration.^* With leaders unable to make the difficult case that a risky intervention in 
the Balkans could be tied to a recognizable “national interest,” no government rushed to 
intervene. In turn, while the systemic interests represented in the Balkans were also real, 
no public would support the unilateral defense of a system from which many benefited.
As James Baker would later say in January 1993, “It is unreasonable to expect the US to 
bear the full burden of intervention when other nations have a stake in the outcome,”^^
As a result, when given the opportunity, the Bush Administration, distracted by fast 
moving events in the Soviet Union and its own reelection struggles, was happy to allow 
Europe the lead on the Yugoslav issue. In turn, the Europeans were anxious to show their
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abilities on the world stage. “This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the 
Americans,” Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, famously commented only 
days after the EC took the lead in negotiating.^^ The legacy of the EC’s mediation 
attempts in the Balkans, first in Slovenia and Croatia and later in Bosnia, created 
circumstances which would play a powerful role in changing Clinton’s policy.
Recognition and Deployment
With the fledgling EC wishing to flex its political and diplomatic muscle, 
European officials took the lead in Balkan peacemaking in June 1991, following the 
commencement of fighting in Slovenia. Pacifying the conflict held special significance 
for proponents of European integi ation, not only because of the inherent dangers posed 
by an unstable Balkans, but because officials saw the crisis as a test of its ability to spealc 
with one voice in a fast-changing Europe.^"* EC officials made little secret of their hope 
that success in the Balkans would both raise the EC’s stature in Washington’s eyes and 
erase the legacy of its muddled response to the Persian Gulf crisis, when the twelve 
countries could not unite behind a uniform political or military response.^^ In fact, only 
days before the fighting in Slovenia began, the EC’s legacy o f weakness in Iraq had 
continued to attract criticism, this time from the German daily Suddeutsche Zeitung, 
which claimed the policy had been, “hectic, clueless, muddled and contradictory,” and 
criticized, “that is how the Community stumbled through its first major test since the end
Alan Riding, “Europeans Send High Level Team,” The New York Times 29 June 1991 : A4.
Alan Riding, “A Toothless Europe?,” The New York Times 4 July 1991: A7.
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of the Cold War and the rebirth of Europe.”^^  Bringing peace to the Balkans in only its 
second post-Cold War test would provide supporters of a politically strong and united 
Europe with a tremendous boost. However, it became almost as essential for the EC to 
be united in its response as it did for it to be effective in its mediation. As a result, the 
German decision to recognize unilaterally the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and in 
turn Bosnia, against the wishes of its fellow EC members, hampered the EC’s approach 
towards peacemaking.
Various factors informed Germany’s decision to unilaterally recognize the 
breakaway Yugoslav republics. The most oft-repeated and oveivalued influences were 
cultural. While it is true that German familiarity with Slovenian and Croatian guest 
workers and fondness for Croatia’s Dalmatian Coast, and the bond o f shared Catholicism 
all played a role in German support for the republics, Germany’s recent history probably 
played the greatest role in swaying public opinion.^^ Themselves recently reunited after 
almost fifty years o f separation following World War II, Germans viewed the republics’ 
ambitions of independence through the prism of a pan-European struggle against 
Communism and Germany’s own reunion after decades of Cold War division. For many 
Germans, the conflict was simply, “an attack by Serbian Communists on peaceful people 
whose only crime has been to vote democratically in favor of independence.”^^  Unlike 
the Bush Administration, which feared recognition as a dangerous precedent for a 
dissolving Soviet Union, or France, Britain, and Spain, which worried that the precedent 
set by recognition could cue demands for greater autonomy or even independence from
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their own minority groups, Germany, without substantial minorities of its own, showed
early support for the independence of the Yugoslav republics/^ As a result, quoting its
own recent history and the principles of self-determination in the 1975 Helsinki accords
on European security, the German government called for the recognition of the republics
shortly after the conflict in Slovenia began.^®
Initially, Germany claimed to support recognition only in concert with its EC
allies, but by December 1991 the Kohl government caved to intense domestic support for
unilateral recognition after it had become clear that the remainder of the EC would not
follow Germany’s lead.^* This decision exposed the Yugoslav policy differences among
the EC’s leading nations, as well as the organization’s inability to close ranks behind a
unified position. “We are stiiving to make our partners understand, starting with
Germany, that it would be prejudicial for Europe as a whole. The attitude of unilateral
recognition could be damaging for the Community,” Foreign Minister Roland Dumas of
France would complain without success.^^ However, when faced with Germany’s
unilateral recognition of the breakaway republics in December 1991 and the prospect of
another embarrassing failure to formulate a unified EC foreign policy stance, the EC
followed with recognition of its own, hoping to keep united the public face of the
Community. As Hoffman suggests:
The main consideration was not the future of Yugoslavia, or even the 
effectiveness of the EC in its first major postwar crisis in Europe; it was the 
preservation of the appearance of unity among the 12 members. A repetition of
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the disarray that had been so conspicuous during the Gulf crisis had to be avoided, 
and the only way of succeeding, given Germany’s strong stand, was an agreement 
on collective recognition that provided a European costume for a policy made in 
Bomi.“
Chancellor Kohl had gambled that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would 
signal to the Serbian leadership that Yugoslavia was doomed to break apart, and this 
would lead to a quick peace settlement.^"* “Preventative recognition,” as the Germans 
called it, also might shift a conflict which many viewed as a civil war into an 
unambiguously international conflict, creating a legal basis for outside powers to aid the 
victims of aggression, and giving Serbia no alternative but to obey the rulings of 
international authorities or to become an international outlaw.^^ The gamble failed when 
recognition led to a declaration of independence by Bosnia, and in turn the Bosnian 
Serbs, and instead of suing for peace, Serbia initiated war to annex parts of the newly 
independent state.
However, recognition was not accompanied by a lifting of the anns embargo 
which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan would later say that this, “left the Serbs in a 
position of overwhelming military dominance and effectively deprived the Republic of 
Bosnia of its right under the Charter of the UN to self-defense.”^^  While critics of the 
embargo often incorrectly claimed that the right for a sovereign government to obtain 
arms to protect its people was inalienable under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is 
certain that the Western governments, “refused to allow a government they did recognize
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(Bosnia) to defend its people against an armed subversion by a government they did not 
recognize (Republika Srpska).”^^
While the Bosnians would not be permitted by the international community to 
receive the arms they needed to defend themselves against attack from within, there was 
also no government willing to deploy its troops to fight to protect the integrity of the new 
Bosnian state. The German constitution forbade its military to act unless in defense of 
German territory or in coordination with allies inside the NATO area, and the conflict in 
Bosnia met neither condition.^^ Further, while leaders of the US, France, and Britain 
were sympathetic to the need to stop the wanton abuse of human rights and pogrom of 
ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serbs, they were unwilling to engage their militaries in 
what many feared would lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire without a discernible national 
interest at stake. “Plenty of countries want forceful action, but not so many want to be 
shot at,” one European diplomat quipped.^^ Instead, loath to inherit responsibility for the 
decaying situation in Bosnia and refusing to give it the tools necessary to defend itself, in 
the interest of unity the EC began a limited engagement into Bosnia, deploying the 
French- and British-led UNPROFOR to protect the delivery of relief supplies during mid- 
1992, first to Sarajevo’s airport and the city itself, and later to other areas in the republic. 
The deployment of these troops created the “UNPROFOR Dilemma,” which would be 
instrumental in derailing the Clinton Administration’s push towards “Lift and Strike.” ®^
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The “UNPROFOR Dilemma”
Following recognition, though still sympathetic to the newly independent 
republics in their struggle against the Serbs, Germany would cease to play a major role in 
the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. Overly sensitive to the legacy of its history, and still 
trying to find its voice and place in post-Cold War Europe, the Kohl government was 
aware of the distrust it had attracted from its EC partners over recognition.^* While the 
German government continued to campaign behind the scenes for the lifting of the arms 
embargo, it refused to break away from the European convoy and support a selective 
lifting.’  ^ Suddenly Germany was the country valuing the importance of EC unity over 
the specifics of the EC’s Balkans policy, and having caused massive intra-EC conflict 
through its decision to recognize the republics, it retreated into the political shadows, 
hoping that its humbled Balkans approach would mend the damage between it and its EC 
partners.
This created a strained relationship between the EC, UNPROFOR, and Bosnia. 
The inherent contradiction in German policy had always been that it lacked the military 
ability to defend its political goal o f supporting the republics in their push for self- 
determination against the Serbs. While it is unfair to blame the hostilities in Bosnia and 
the destruction of Yugoslavia on German recognition, as there is little evidence that either 
the Bosnians or the Serbs could have created conditions in which Bosnia could have 
survived alone with Serbia and Montenegro in a rump Yugoslavia, it is also important to 
recognize the German role. The decision to recognize the republics helped to trigger a
intervention, and thus the creation of the “UNPROFOR Dilemma” was in fact intentional. For more 
information, see Simms, Unfinest. 70.
Gow. Triumph. 172.
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conflict which would require outside intervention to control, and Germany, the one nation 
which supported recognition, was also the one nation which was powerless to use force to 
stop the fighting.
As a result, France and Britain, to maintain EC unity, inherited an impossible 
peacekeeping operation which they consistently had attempted to avoid, resulting in this 
“UNPROFOR Dilemma.” France and Britain had deployed thousands of troops onto the 
ground in Bosnia as peacekeepers to maintain EC unity and preserve their leading role on 
the world stage. As medium sized powers with large aspirations, maintaining strong 
diplomatic clout would necessitate France and Britain taking leading roles in the 
important international organizations to which they belonged, and peacekeeping in 
Bosnia was a perfect oppoitunity to “punch above their weight” in the international 
arena.’  ^ However, they remained unwilling to risk an escalation of the Bosnian conflict 
to force a peace. Thus, when the US attempted to initiate military actions to end the 
conflict in Bosnia, neither France nor Britain was willing to join it.
Trans-Atlantic Perceptions of the Bosnian Conflict and “Lift and Strike”
To understand the effect o f the “UNPROFOR Dilemma” on the Clinton 
Administration’s “Lift and Strike” policy, one must first examine certain important 
differences in the trans-Atlantic perceptions o f the Bosnian conflict. Washington viewed 
the conflict through a relatively simple lens: the sovereign nation of Bosnia was under 
attack and deserved protection.^"* As well, the Bosnian Serbs’ methods of ethnic
James Gow, “British Perspectives,” Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.). International 
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cleansing were so repugnant that Clinton steadfastly refiised to support any plan which 
recognized the “ill-gotten Serbian gains that stem from ethnic cleansing.”^^  It was on 
these grounds that the Clinton Administration did not endorse the VOPP. Without first 
pushing the Serbs off land captured during the first year of the conflict, thus allowing the 
Bosnians an equitable share of the former republic, the Americans refused to pressure the 
Bosnian leadership into suing for peace. The "Lift and Strike" policy would give the 
Bosnians the chance to recapture what the Americans believed was rightfully theirs, 
opening the door for what the Clinton Administration deemed a “just” peace.
The European view was far more nuanced. First, the Europeans had a far less 
“black and white” view of Serbian culpability, and a more “realist” view of the conflict’s 
causes. Although civilians in Bosnia were targeted because of their ethnicity, many 
Europeans still believed that the conflict represented a “traditional war over tenitory.”^^  
While Europe’s leaders were aware of the scope of the crimes perpetrated by the Serbs 
against the Bosnians, there was also a sense that the Yugoslavs were, “all impossible 
people... as bad as each other, and there are just more Serbs.”^^  Under the European 
position lay not an approval of Serbian ethnic cleansing, but a tendency to question the 
realism of defending a state whose existence was opposed by a majority of its 
inhabitants.^^ The Europeans seemed to have a gr eater sense of urgency to end the 
conflict immediately, as the conflict threatened to flood the EC with Yugoslav refugees. 
Lifting the arms embargo removed the Bosnians’ incentive to sue for peace, and while 
this was precisely the objective of the Americans who designed the policy, for European
Elaine Sciolino, “US Declines to Back Peace Plan as the Balkans Talks Shift to UN,” The New York 
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leaders, a plan which promised to deepen the conflict, instead of ending it as quickly as 
possible, had to be resisted at all costs.
Underlying the European distaste for Washington’s policy was the American 
refusal to deploy ground troops alongside its European partners, while simultaneously 
pushing a policy which many Europeans felt seriously risked the safety of their own 
peacekeeping soldiers. With troops on the ground who were lightly armed and operating 
under difficult rules of engagement, the Europeans consistently resisted a policy which 
could cause a massive backlash against the UNPROFOR, and had only a questionable 
chance of succeeding. Instead of raising Bosnian expectations that an American ground 
force would intervene on their behalf, the Europeans felt it a more humane solution to 
make clear that “they weren’t going to get the UN cavalry coming to their rescue.”^^
This major inconsistency, of American insistence to raise the pressure against the Serbs 
without offering ground troops while simultaneously refusing to pressure the Bosnians 
into accepting an unjust outcome, remained the primary stumbling block to a trans- 
Atlantic consensus for its Bosnian policy. In his unwillingness to offer American ground 
troops to UNPROFOR, President Clinton failed to protect what mediator David Owen 
would refer to as the “exposed jugular of American policy.” ®^
The “UNPROFOR Dilemma” and “Lift and Strilce”
As will be unearthed in subsequent sections, understanding the intra-EC politics 
regarding recognition explains how America’s allies played an important role in derailing 
“Lift and Strike.” It is essential to understand why Britain and France accepted the task
Simms, Unfinest. 65. 
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of Balkan peacekeeping but refused to allow the US to engage in Bosnian peacemaJdng. 
As neither country had a national interest in assuring Bosnian peace, and had deployed 
their troops primarily in the interest of maintaining EC unity, they refused to allow any 
policy which risked the conflict’s escalation. Each American proposal to lift the embargo 
and use air strikes was consistently met with European threats to immediately withdraw 
their troops, bequeathing unilateral responsibility for Bosnian peace to the US military. 
The power of this European threat to withdraw from the Balkans placing the US in the 
unenviable task of bringing peace to the region was undeniable, and represented the 
greatest single stumbling block the execution of "Lift and Strike." With no domestic 
support for a unilateral Bosnian intervention, and with the Clinton Administration relying 
on various domestic actors to push through its expansive domestic policy agenda, strong 
opposition to inheriting a quagmire in the Balkans greatly increased the chance that a 
failed intervention would derail Clinton’s entire domestic policy agenda. Examining the 
stances of these various domestic actors will show how a "Lift and Strike" failure would 
have posed such a risk, eventually causing Clinton to halt the march towards intervention.
39
Chapter 3 -  The Domestic Level
Section I:
The Foreign Policy Triad
This section will assess the role of Clinton’s foreign policy triad, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and National Security 
Adviser (NSA) Anthony Lake, in pushing the administration’s strategy away from the 
activist "Lift and Strike" policy by May 1993. It shows how the combination of the 
National Security Council’s (NSC) organizational structure, Clinton’s failure to devote 
ample attention to foreign policy formulation, the president’s choice of appointments to 
these key positions, their performance in their roles, and the members’ failure to advocate 
in favor of "Lift and Strike" even at the expense of Clinton’s domestic policy goals 
encouraged the president not to fulfill his campaign promise of Bosnian intervention. 
While the triad would not contribute to Clinton’s decision to abandon "Lift and Strike" in 
the same way that the other actors would, their role is still instructive. As a unit the triad 
failed to strengthen Clinton’s focus on foreign policy at the expense of domestic policy.
In turn, Clinton would prioritize domestic policy over foreign policy in the decision to 
abandon "Lift and Strike,” Further, as individual advisers, the members also failed to 
strengthen Clinton’s policy. Christopher failed to strong diplomatic leadership, Aspin 
was unable to improve the weak relations between Clinton and the military, and Lake 
was marginalized during the administration’s first months and did not play the important 
factor an NSA should in the formulation of such a policy.
In turn, the members o f Clinton’s foreign policy team not only provided the 
president with a poor Balkans strategy, they failed in their primary assigmnent: protecting
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Clinton’s all-important domestic policy agenda from interference by the foreign arena. 
Understanding these failures makes clearer how other actors were able to gain such 
influence of the administration’s policy. Without clear direction and leadership from his 
foreign policy triad, Clinton’s policy was liijacked by a combination of interests, and 
would become more beholden to the advancement of Clinton’s domestic policy agenda 
than the execution of a sound American foreign policy.
Three primary factors will explain the policy triad’s failure to press Clinton to 
follow tlirough with the execution of the "Lift and Strike" policy. First, Clinton did not 
spend ample time or energy on American foreign policy during the presidency’s early 
days. Opting to delegate much of the most important decision making to his foreign 
policy triad, Clinton hoped his advisers would form a consensus behind well-constructed 
policy options towards which he would then give his support. However, well formed 
foreign policies require presidential participation during the formulation stage, and 
Clinton’s lack of participation made arriving at consensus difficult for his foreign policy 
triad. Without strong consensus for the strategy, Clinton ultimately found it impossible 
to support “Lift and Strike.”
Equally damaging to the formulation of a strong Bosnia policy was the 
performance Christopher and Aspin. Christopher had a long and distinguished career in 
government, but may have been best suited for deputy role. As secretary, he was unable 
to rise to the challenge of guiding American foreign policy following the Cold War 
without the compass of Containment to determine America’s national interest and policy 
goals. As well, determined to protect Clinton’s expansive domestic agenda from 
interference by events in the foreign arena, Christopher did not press Clinton to ignore
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certain domestic goals in order to bring peace to Bosnia. As a result, America’s most 
important foreign policy officer, its secretary of state, failed to advocate for the interests 
of his realm, and America’s Bosnia policy suffered as a result. Christopher’s failure 
would be most strongly felt during his disastrous May 1993 attempt to convince 
America’s allies to support the “Lift and Strike” policy.
Les Aspin was highly intelligent and knowledgeable in defense issues, but his 
personality and work habits made him a poor choice for the office o f secretary of defense. 
His unsuitability for the office would have itself weakened the administration’s 
politico/military relations. However, considering Clinton’s already poor working 
relationship with the Pentagon, Aspin was not a strong candidate to repair the rift 
between the executive and the military, let alone help to persuade the military to abandon 
its instincts, ignore Colin Powell’s clear advice, and support a risky intervention in the 
Balkans.
Finally, while Anthony Lake was a wise choice for the role of NSA, without 
Clinton’s close support and participation, he was unable to quickly find a suitable 
successor to America’s Cold War doctrine of Containment. Though Lake remained a 
proponent of stronger action in the Balkans throughout the first months of Clinton’s 
presidency, without a new direction for American foreign policy, placing Balkan peace in 
the context of American national interest became impossible. As a result, though he 
attempted to strengthen Clinton’s hand on the Bosnia issue during the 1992 campaign and 
during early 1993, Lake was partially marginalized and failed to be influential outside of 
his role in the foreign policy triad, which itself was marginalized during this period.
By discharging their assignments to protect Clinton’s expansive domestic agenda
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from interference by the foreign arena, the actions of Clinton’s foreign policy triad left 
America’s foreign policy without powerful advocates inside the government. This left an 
administration already focused on the domestic arena without advocates to balance the 
administration’s policy priorities. The result of this void was an administration that too 
often ignored the importance of a powerful and cohesive agenda for the international 
arena. In turn, the execution of an activist Balkan intervention became a casualty to 
Clinton’s domestic policy agenda.
Clinton’s foreign policy triad failed him in its Balkans policy guidance. While 
attempting to protect his domestic policy goals from distraction by the foreign arena, it 
enabled Clinton to reduce temporarily America’s Balkans commitment, but failed in its 
primary task of protecting the domestic arena from interference. The "Lift and Strike" 
policy, though unpopular amongst America’s European allies, represented the West’s 
strongest response to the Serb’s aggression in Bosnia. After shelving it and following the 
weak European lead, the conflict only expanded. By 1995, Clinton’s poor handling of 
the events in Bosnia had become a liability not only to his foreign policy legacy, but to 
his reelection chances, and thus, to his entire presidency. Facing attacks from the media, 
public. Congress, and his political opponents, Clinton would be forced to take an 
enormous political risk through America’s spearheading and hosting o f the Dayton Peace 
Conference. Bringing an end to the conflict in Bosnia would become not only an 
important foreign policy issue, but an essential ingredient to Clinton’s reelection chances. 
By having talcen a weak stance against Balkan aggression during 1993, the situation in 
Bosnia grew into an acute foreign policy dilemma. Clinton’s advisers misinterpreted the 
conflict in Bosnia as a first term foreign policy issue. In that they failed to understand
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that ending the conflict in the Balkans was the administration’s essential defense for 
protecting domestic policy from interference by the foreign arena, Clinton’s foreign 
policy triad failed him in their primary assignment of protecting the domestic arena from 
interference by foreign policy issues.^*
The creation of American foreign policy requires a delicate balance between 
many countervailing interests, and, to this end, the foreign policy triad must attempt to 
advocate for a clear and strong foreign policy, often against the interests of other factions 
inside government. However, as subsequent sections will show, the failure of the Clinton 
Administration’s triad to fulfill this role allowed a president already predisposed to 
pushing for a strong domestic policy to ignore important goals of the foreign arena. 
American policy in Bosnia suffered as a result.
The NSC’s Organizational Structure and Clinton’s Involvement
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the NSC has acted as the primary advisoiy 
body through for a president’s foreign policy. By statue, the NSC consists of the heads of 
the departments of state, defense, intelligence (CIA), the vice-president, and the chairman 
of the joint chiefs of staff. Tradition has dictated that the assistant to the president for 
national security affairs (or NSA) also plays a leading role in this advisory body. The 
NSA, together with the secretaries o f state and defense, form the policy triad, the highest 
level conduit through which the president may execute his foreign policy agenda. 
Understanding the organizational structure, membership, and performance of Clinton’s 
NSC and the leadership provided by its foreign policy triad will be essential both for 
unearthing the administration’s failure to implement its "Lift and Strike" policy and in
Drew. Edge. 138.
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examining the roles of other actors in altering this policy.
By any account, throughout 1993, Clinton was far more focused on America’s 
domestic rather than its foreign policy. Reports surfaced as early as two weeks into 
Clinton’s presidency that members of the foreign policy team had confided jealousy to 
their domestic policy counterparts over the time and attention the president was spending 
on domestic issues such as the budget and health care.^^
Thomas Friedman illustrates the extent to which Clinton ignored America’s 
Bosnia policy process with an anecdote:
During a meeting of... economic advisers... Alice Rivlin was describing 
areas of the country that would be effected by the withdrawal of a Federal 
Timber subsidy when she found herself being corrected by President 
Clinton over which trees were found where. A short time later, Clinton’s 
top foreign policy advisers were gathered pouring over a map of Bosnia, 
... to establish the Administration’s policy for the Balkans, its first major 
foreign policy initiative. The President did not coixect anybody about 
details on Bosnia. He did not attend.^^
Friedman’s anecdote is instructive, though not unique. Clinton was not focused 
on foreign policy during the early days of his presidency. He had been elected on a 
platform of domestic renewal, and, as reports that during a January 1993 Camp David 
retreat Clinton listed the goals for the presidency’s first one hundred days without 
mentioning any foreign policy objectives illustrate, domestic policy was the only area 
gaining Clinton’s attention.^"* Aides argued that the president was not ignoring the 
foreign policy challenges facing the United States, but instead had “delegated” foreign 
policy formulation to his key aides in the arena: Christopher, Aspin, Lake and Deputy
Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy on Back Burner,” The New York Times 8 
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National Security Adviser Sandy Berger/^ In reality, Clinton was focused almost 
exclusively on domestic policy, viewing his responsibility for America’s foreign policy 
as a necessary burden of the office rather than a primaiy area of interest.^^ As a result, 
when pressing domestic issues captured the president’s attention, foreign policy was 
relegated to second status. At one point, CIA Director James Woolsey had so much 
difficulty making his way onto Clinton’s schedule, he enlisted the help of a retired Navy 
Admiral with White House connections to convince Clinton of the need for daily 
intelligence briefings.^^ When Clinton did take an active interest in foreign policy, he 
did so through the prism of domestic policy, concentrating on such economic agenda 
items as NAFTA. Yet when it came to foreign policy issues such as Bosnia, rather than 
personally participate in the policy process, Clinton instructed his foreign policy advisers 
to present their recommendations for his approval, preferring a strong consensus for the 
final policy proposal.^^ As one early report explained, “On domestic policy issues Mr. 
Clinton is personally absorbed in the give and take. But on foreign policy, he has 
basically asked these aides to work out solutions and submit them to him to be approved 
or rejected.”^^
As long as one considers that, “Presidential performance is not bound by a single 
model... (nor) does the President necessarily engage in a conscious effort to adopt to a 
particular model and shape his performance accordingly,” examining the organization of 
Clinton’s foreign policy triad helps to illuminate some o f its poor performance in
Friedman, “Clinton Keeping,” 8 Februaiy 1993.
^ Alexander George and Juliette L. George, Presidential Personality & Performance. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1998) 248.
Drew. Edge. 153.
Elaine Sciolino, “In Congress, Urgent Calls for Action Against the Serbs,” The New York Times 40 
April 1993: A9.
George, Presidential Personality. 244.
46
advising the president on American policy for Bosnia.^^ Clinton organized his foreign
policy advisory apparatus in a way that seemed an, “uneasy blend of collegiality and
formalism explicitly designed.. .to limit the extent of presidential engagement in foreign
policy making -  and allow him to focus on his domestic agenda.”^^  This is in sharp
contrast to the collegial organizational model as it was originally established by Kennedy,
who designed the system in order to be personally involved in the policymaking process.
Clinton established the system to allow him a low level of engagement, delegating much
of the day-to-day management of foreign policy to his advisers.^^ Yet as Alexander and
Juliette George astutely observe, one must question whether the
collegial foreign policy system can function effectively with a President who 
wishes to maintain a relatively high degree of detachment from the policy 
process. Collegial systems generally have been seen as a way of immersing the 
President in the policymaking process as a means of bringing to bear the 
collective experience of the advisers on policy issues, rather than 
compartmentalizing responsibility.^^
The decision to delegate this key presidential responsibility to his deputies 
directly effected America’s Bosnia policy. Without greater amounts of direct presidential 
participation, Clinton’s policy triad remained unable to create the consensus he desired 
for determining American policy. Reconciling disagreements amongst his advisers 
during key stages of the policy process is the responsibility of any president. As a result, 
“presidential leadership is critical to effective national security policy formulation and 
execution.” "^^ Yet, with only sporadic presidential involvement in the policy process, the 
triad-led foreign policy team remained unable to create the consensus Clinton demanded.
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Though ostensibly chaired by Lake, without presidential participation, NSC 
meetings lacked the guidance necessary to produce clear policy. Most of the members 
had worked closely together for more than a decade, and while that familiarity created the 
“collegial” atmosphere Clinton hoped for, without either direct presidential involvement 
or an atmosphere of institutional awe at each other’s positions, the meetings lacked 
discipline, more closely resembled grad school “bull sessions,” and were characterized by 
interruptions and lack of f o c u s . S a i d  one observer, “It wasn’t policymaking. It was 
group therapy -  an existential debate over what is the role of America, etc.”^^  While it 
was in Christopher’s nature not to take part in most policy discussions, letting the issues 
unfold through debate by his colleagues before offering his opinion as to which options 
were most practical, the debates often produced no quality options, thus all but nullifying 
Christopher’s role in the discussions.^^ Aspin was often similarly unhelpful, using the 
debates to act as an “intellectual gadfly,” expounding at length and with considerable 
creativity on several sides of an issue, but without taking a clear cut position.^®
Further, even when he did attend, the meetings resembled the chaos o f Clinton’s 
domestic policy sessions, where the president would be bombarded with conflicting 
advice, and use his strong command of the policy issues at hand to make decisions. 
However, without such expertise in the arena of foreign policy, the divisions of Clinton’s 
top advisors only contributed to the president’s ambivalence,^^ In the absence of 
consensus fi-om his advisors, or even a majority support for a single option, Clinton
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continually deferred his final decision. As a result, months after Lake had launched a 
new series of discussions for determining the administration’s policy, no decisions had 
been made.
Clinton had subcontracted America’s foreign policy formulation to what he felt 
was a collection of highly intelligent and competent lieutenants, demonstrating an 
enormous amount o f confidence in their capabilities. This particular organizational 
structure of the foreign policy apparatus places a great deal of pressure onto the foreign 
policy triad to lead the NSC and its constituent bodies without direct presidential 
participation. To the extent that they would fail him in this regard, serious problems are 
to be expected, and, in this case, divided amongst themselves and faced with the prospect 
o f creating consensus without direct presidential participation, the triad failed to designed 
a successful policy. The results of this failure weakened America’s Bosnia policy
greatly. However, while part o f the blame can be placed on Clinton for not directly 
participating in foreign policy formulation, as the subsequent section will suggest, the 
poor composition o f his foreign policy triad additionally helps to explain how Clinton’s 
advisers provided the president with poor foreign policy guidance.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher
This section examines Warren Christopher’s role in designing and executing the 
Clinton Administration’s Bosnia policy during the first months o f 1993. Chosen to 
submerge pressing foreign policy issues in order to allow Clinton to focus on his 
expansive domestic agenda, under Christopher’s guidance the foreign policy triad was
Daalder. Davton. 13.
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unable to overcome the difficult challenges posed by the war in the Balkans.
Christopher’s unsuitability for the role of secretary of state, determination to protect the 
administration’s domestic policy agenda, and subsequent failure to provide the 
administration with strong foreign policy leadership, damaged the administration’s ability 
to formulate and implement a strong Bosnia policy in two ways. First, although at times 
supportive of the "Lift and Strike" plan, Christopher also feared that American 
involvement in Bosnia could derail Clinton’s domestic policy goals, often acting to stall 
policies of intervention. In turn, by glossing over the administration’s failure to stop the 
genocide in Bosnia, and failing to push Clinton to intervene in the Balkans, he failed to 
protect the administration’s foreign policy in favor o f its domestic policy, ultimately 
contributing to conditions in which the administration’s Balkans failure would threaten 
Clinton’s entire presidency. Second, when tasked with gaining support for "Lift and 
Strike" firom America’s European allies, Christopher, though working under difficult 
circumstances, did a poor job, resulting in the administration’s embarrassing 
abandonment of the policy.
By the time of Clinton’s inauguration, Warren Christopher had assembled as 
impressive a resume as any public servant of his generation, making him seem well 
groomed for the job of secretary o f state. Further, Christopher’s reputation and 
membership in the Democratic establishment provided Clinton, still not well connected 
or proven amongst pillars of the national party, with a cabinet member well versed in 
Washington politics with insider credentials and national credibility that were beyond 
reproach. But, while Chiistopher was a highly competent bureaucrat, he lacked the 
innovation and foreign policy philosophy necessary to lead the State Department at such
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a critical moment in history. Though Clinton had been well aware of Christopher’s 
limitations when he appointed him secretary, hoping that Christopher would still prove 
adept at submerging foreign policy issues while Clinton concentrated on American 
domestic policy, that decision would prove destructive for America’s Bosnia policy.
At the start of his presidency, Clinton hoped to invest energy on foreign policy 
issues only when crises loomed, relying instead on his ability as a “quick study” to make 
shrewd and effective political decisions on any subject. Otherwise, he hoped to keep 
foreign policy minimized, and, if  possible, on the back burner. Therefore, Clinton’s 
secretary of state could not be an activist willing to risk the completion of his domestic 
agenda on new and unpredictable foreign policy initiatives. Thus, warnings that 
Christopher lacked the vision to guide the State Department beyond the Cold War, and 
that he was, “immensely hard working, but not necessarily imaginative... a man to be a 
functionary rather than a leader,” probably helped validate his candidacy for Clinton. 
Indeed, while many colleagues reported that Christopher was neither a foreign policy 
innovator nor a visionary, even Christopher admitted that he was not particularly 
interested in emerging global issues such as the environment or population control. 
Christopher’s primary value to the administration was that he understood his role, as well 
as the role of foreign policy, in the Clinton White House. According to one 
administration official, Clinton most liked, “that (Christopher) did not give off any 
heat.”^^  ^ However, while Clinton thought Christopher could be counted on to formulate 
“safe” policy decisions that fit the goals of his administration, such decisions, “would not
Drew. Edge. 138.
David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush. Clinton, and the Generals (London: Scribner, 2001) 
168.
Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace. 174.
Drew, Edge. 140.
Halberstam, War in a Time o f Peace. 174.
51
end up being safe, because everything (Christopher) did would be premised on 
conventional choices and this was a world where decisions could no longer be 
conventional.”^^  ^ As David Halberstam suggests, Clinton, “wanted a status quo national 
security team in what was most demonstrably no longer a status quo world.”
Shutting Down Bosnia in Favor o f  Domestic Policy
Christopher, without the foreign policy vision necessary to recognize the dangers 
that submerging foreign policy could pose to the health of Clinton’s entire presidency, 
acted firom the earliest days of the presidency to downgrade the administration’s 
commitment to Bosnian intervention, eventually working methodically to shut down an 
activist Bosnia policy, reportedly afiraid that an inteiwention could damage Clinton’s 
domestic agenda. Examples of Christopher’s attempts to downgrade the
administration’s responsibility can be best seen during two key policy crossroads of early 
1993, and in refusal to classify the events in Bosnia as a “genocide,” an admission which, 
under international law, would have compelled an American intervention.
The first example can be seen immediately following the inauguration, when the 
triad led the Principles Committee (PC) through the first reassessment of American 
policy towards the region, producing Presidential Review Directive-1 (PRD-1). During 
the authoring of that document, the administration’s foreign policy Principles, without the 
direct participation of either Clinton or Vice-President Gore, explored several options. 
Instead of choosing to implement the campaign-time strategy, after reportedly being 
swayed by both Christopher and Colin Powell’s disapproval o f an activist intervention.
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the group concluded the meeting having only examined, “a very wide range of 
options.”  ^ To allow Clinton to remain focused on the domestic agenda, Christopher had 
helped to defer the administration’s first opportunity to initiate the campaign strategy.
A similar failure can be seen through Christopher’s February 10,1993 press 
conference, during which the Clinton Administration presented its first Bosnia proposal. 
While Christopher used strong words to describe the administration’s new policy 
direction, exclaiming that the US would not tolerate ethnic cleansing, the policy he had 
helped produce was decidedly weak, emphasizing only the limits the US would go to, to 
bring peace to the region, * ^  ^  In his memoir, even Christopher admitted that mismatch 
between his rhetoric and the administration’s commitment to Balkan peace, a 
phenomenon one aide blamed on “campaign overhang.”  ^ Only weeks later, on Meet the 
Press^ Christopher would be forced to acknowledge the mismatch, as well as Clinton’s 
retreat firom the tough campaign rhetoric, offering only that, “I don’t suppose you’d 
expect anybody to keep a campaign promise if  it was very unsound policy.”  ^ In fact, 
Christopher had remained weary of a strong policy, and had again pushed for a wealc 
administration response during the policy process. Christopher was also the main 
mouthpiece through which the administration attempted to soften its failure in the 
Balkans by appealing to context to ease the moral discomfort caused by not acting to save 
the Bosnians.^ While Christopher’s use of language for this purpose has already been 
cataloged in Chapter 1, his attempts to stop the administration’s characterization of the
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conflict as a genocide, and thus remove any legal responsibility for intervention, deserve 
greater examination.
Following the February 10 press conference, in which Christopher had made clear 
that crimes were occurring in the Balkans and that the US could not allow them to 
continue, Christopher made several attempts to quiet claims that the administration was 
complicit in a genocide. The first of these came during a heated debate during a 
Congressional hearing between Christopher and Congress’ greatest proponent of 
intervention, Representative Frank McCloskey (D-IN). When faced with direct 
questioning as to the nature of the killing in Bosnia, Christopher refused to refer to the 
conflict as a genocide, only promising to conduct research into the issue and return to 
Congress with an answer.* It was following this exchange that Christopher ordered 
officials in the State Department to unearth evidence of crimes by Bosnian Muslims 
against Serbs.*
However, instead of initiating such a study, Christopher only sought to silence the 
State Department’s Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) working on Balkans policy in 
Washington whose analysis had classified the conflict as a “genocide.” Following 
instructions by outgoing State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, Marshall Harris, 
the State Department’s Bosnia desk officer, drafted a statement in April stating that, “the 
United States Government believes that the practice o f ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia 
includes actions that meet the international definition of genocide.”**^  However, afraid of 
the ramifications such an admission, Christopher “killed” the memo through incoming 
spokesman, and longtime personal assistant, Tom Donilon. As will be seen again in
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Chapter 4, Christopher had mirrored the former Bush Administration’s Balkans strategy 
by focusing not on solving the conflict, but instead on minimizing the political damage 
done by not confronting Serbian aggression.
In response to having his memo silenced by forces inside the State Department, 
Harris drafted a letter to Christopher, signed by eleven other leading State Department 
Balkans experts, which characterized the conflict as a “genocide,” castigated Western 
policy for its failures, and recommended military action against the S e r b s . O n c e  
leaked to the press, this letter exposed to the general public the schism between 
Christopher and the FSOs involved in the policymaking process.**^ While Susan Power 
credits this rift with pushing Christopher to finally support "Lift and Strike,” the 
administration continued to refuse to characterize the conflict as a “genocide.” Following 
the administration’s failure to enact the tough "Lift and Strike" policy, several of the 
FSOs who signed the letter resigned their posts. Harris would remain a tough critic of 
Christopher, saying later, “What you hear Secretary Christopher and others saying (that 
Bosnia does not constitute genocide) is not true. What you see on your television screens 
is what’s happening in Bosnia.”*^ ^
Beyond clouding the events in the Balkans to allow Clinton to continue to press 
his domestic agenda, by failing to promote a stronger policy in Bosnia, Cliristopher also 
failed to promote the interests of foreign policy inside the administration. Such a public 
expression of displeasure by FSOs against the policies articulated by the Secretary of 
State is very rare, as are resignations from the Foreign Service based on policy
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disagreements.*^* With the State Department’s entire slate of Balkans experts aligned 
against the administration’s weak policy, one may infer the failure to produce a more 
robust response to events in the Balkans was based on other political considerations. The 
formulation of a balanced policy agenda requires that department leaders attempt to 
promote strong policies for their arenas, allowing the president to determine which 
competing interests best advance the needs of the administration and the United States. 
The result of having the nation’s top foreign policy officer focused primarily on 
protecting the domestic policy realm would be wealc international policy, and an 
examination of Christopher’s policy legacy and the administration’s weak response to 
events in the Balkans suggests that such a lopsided approach was used in the Clinton 
Administration. Christopher concentrated more on protecting the administration, and 
thus the domestic agenda, from the fallout of failed responses to Serbian aggression 
rather than halting the aggression itself, as a result, the administration lacked an 
important advocate for "Lift and Strike.”
Christopher in Europe
Understanding Christopher’s May 1993 trip to visit America’s key 
European allies is essential to any investigation of the Clinton Administration’s failed 
"Lift and Strike" policy. *^  ^ When Christopher returned after having failed to gain the 
Europeans’ support for Clinton’s strategy, the "Lift and Strike" policy was effectively 
shelved, and the Clinton Administration found itself supporting the Europeans’ “safe
Grove, “Agony,” 41.
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areas” proposal, a plan with which it had publicly criticized only weeks earlier 
Though his task of gaining European support for "Lift and Strike" was a difficult one, and 
the context within which he met with Europe’s leaders was not auspicious for altering the 
strong European resistance to the policy, Christopher’s performance and approach to the 
negotiations nonetheless deserve criticism, and are further indicative of his unsuitability 
for the office of secretary of state.
Three factors further complicated the context in which Christopher attempted the 
already difficult task of gaining European support for "Lift and Strike.” First, many of 
Europe’s leaders seemed predisposed to opposing the policy, a fact the Clinton 
Administration must have understood before dispatching Christopher. As one British 
diplomat said later, “We told them that until we were blue in the face. We said we can’t 
do "Lift and Strike,” especially “Lift.” . .. There was nothing Christopher could have 
done to get a different outcome.”*^ '* Such initial opposition suggests that to have been 
successful, Christopher would have had to deliver a strong and persuasive presentation.
Second, upon arriving at his first destination, Christopher learned that Radovan 
Karadzic had signed the latest UN/EC-sponsored VOPP. Instantly, discussions over the 
Bosnian Serbs’ failure to end the conflict in Bosnia had moved firom the practical to the 
theoretical.*^^ As a result, America’s European allies were waiting to learn the results of 
the Bosnian Serb parliament’s ratification of that treaty, and were unwilling to agree to 
military strikes while the possibility for a peaceful resolution still existed. In a deft 
procedural maneuver, the Bosnian Serb parliament waited for Christopher to finish his
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tour across Europe before rejecting the treaty outright. However, this provided the allies 
with an excuse not to support the proposal, and with the Europeans’ answer having been 
clearly delivered to the Clinton Administration, the Serbs’ decision to continue the war 
did not alter the equation, and "Lift and Strike" remained shelved.
Third, in order to gain the American public’s support for "Lift and Strike,” it 
would be necessary to engage in a multilateral, as opposed to a unilateral, action against 
the Serbs. As a result, Christopher worked into his "Lift and Strike" proposal the 
unrealistic expectation that both France and Britain supply bombers and pilots to attack 
the Serbs, further reducing the likelihood of gaining European support.
Thus Christopher traveled to Eui'ope to gather support from America’s allies with 
the high probability that such a trip would fail. While defenders of the secretary’s 
performance claim that “critics who said that Christopher could have been successfiil if 
he had been tougher with the Europeans were off base,” this position ignores 
Christopher’s poor presentation of the "Lift and Strike" policy to the Europeans. While it 
is unfair to suggest that Christopher traveled to Europe and made no earnest attempt to 
gain support for the administration’s policy, by failing to assume America’s traditional 
role as the primary architect of European security policy, Christopher’s lifeless 
performance invited the Europeans’ dismissive response.
As Christopher recalls, “we decided not to frame the President’s plan as a fa it 
accompli. My instructions were to take a more conciliatory approach, laying the proposal 
before our allies, describing it as the only complete option on the table, and asking for
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their support.” Even before Christopher arrived, European leaders needed only 
examine the headlines of The New York Times to Icnow that the administration would not 
force their hand on the Bosnia issue, lest it drive them out of the region, and be forced to 
manage the conflict alone. As a Christopher aide explained before the Secretary arrived, 
“He is not going with a plan in his pocket. He is going with some ideas and framework 
for discussion.” With the allies already predisposed against "Lift and Strike,” the 
Christopher approach only strengthened their position. As Daalder explains:
Normally these conversations, while couched in the language of consultation, are 
direct and to the point. ‘American policy is X, and we thank you for your 
support.’ Christopher’s self-described ‘conciliatory approach’ -  consisting of 
talking points that... started within the phrase, ‘I am here in listening mode’ 
differed so completely fr om the prevailing norm that the allies could not believe 
that the Administration was serious.*^ **
Christopher’s comments to the international press also strengthened the allies’ 
position, as he made clear that the Clinton Administration would not press them into 
accepting "Lift and Strike.” In Paris, he told reporters, “I’m hearing out (the French 
leaders’) questions and their concerns which I’ll report back to the President and could 
involve some adjustments of the various proposals that we have.”*^* As Christopher 
moved from capital to capital his goals became more modest. Two days later, he would 
declare that the American “direction” was on the table not only for “discussion” but also 
for “amendment.”* Contrasted with Lake’s successful presentations to many of the
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same European leaders two years later, in which he noticed that when the United States 
acted as the “big dog” others followed, Christopher’s strategy seems designed to fail. 
Whereas Lake quietly concluded after each successful meeting that “the big dog had 
barked,” Christopher would downplay his chances of success to the media, publicly 
lowering his expectations and the chances for success.
Whereas Christopher’s public comments made creating a consensus for "Lift and 
Strike" seem unlikely, his private performances during the presentations similarly 
promised little chance of gaining the Europeans’ support. His presentation would often 
begin unconvincingly by noting that while there were no good options for dealing with 
Bosnia, "Lift and Strike" was the “least worst” among them.*^ "* During his talks with the 
skeptical French, Christopher took the time to point out the limitations of air strikes, 
predicting that air strikes could lead to open-ended intervention and the Serbs would be 
strongly temped to escalate the conflict. An official present at the meeting between 
Christopher and NATO Secretary-General Manfi*ed Woemer criticized the secretary of 
state’s poor salesmanship, as Christopher’s singular lack of enthusiasm for the policy 
seemed evident. In fact, while never lifting his nose firom his notes, Christopher, “started 
talking about the proposed US policy... in a way that emphasized the disadvantages 
rather than the advantages... (Woemer) was being invited to thinlc the policy was a bad 
idea.”‘ ‘^
Upon hearing that Christopher had returned to the US describing his failure to 
gain the Europeans’ support as a “healthy exchange of ideas” with his European
For Lake’s European trip, see Daalder, Davton. 112-114. 
Daalder. Davton. 15.
Sciolino, “Uncertainty on Bosnia,” 5 May 1993.
Power, A Problem From Hell. 302.
60
counterparts, Richard Pearle, a former Bush Administration defense department official, 
scoffed that indeed there had been an exchange: “Christopher went over to Europe with 
an American policy and he came back with a European one.”*^  ^ While it is possible that 
no diplomat could have gained European support for "Lift and Strike,” Christopher’s 
failed performance assured that Clinton’s approach would be shelved. No longer was it 
possible for the Clinton Administration to claim that America’s pretense of European 
leadership remained. Even Christopher was forced to admit when asked whether he had 
changed his mind about the usefulness of the policy, “No, I haven’t changed my views. I 
just don’t know if I’ve changed anyone else’s.”*^  ^ The US had attempted to create a 
coalition behind "Lift and Strike” and failed. While circumstances had made his a 
difficult task, Christopher’s performance in Europe’s capitals did little to improve the 
Clinton Administration’s chances of success.
Though it is possible that Christopher lacked the diplomatic skills to make a 
persuasive presentation, a fact which would be hard to believe of the man who had 
negotiated the release of the captured Americans during the Iran hostage crisis, one must 
also question if the secretary, who had never been a strong advocate of intervention in 
Bosnia for fear it would derail Clinton’s domestic agenda, was actually doing everything 
in his power to assure that the US did not unilaterally inherit the peacemaking role over 
Bosnia. Pressing the Europeans to support the "Lift and Strike" policy risked a major 
confrontation with America’s allies which would have made the Clinton Administration 
solely responsible for bringing peace to Bosnia, and while stopping Serbian aggression 
had been among Clinton’s campaign objectives, it could not detract from his domestic
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agenda. Christopher had been appointed to “submerge” America’s foreign policy to 
allow Clinton to focus on domestic policy. By failing to gain European support for a 
risky foreign initiative, he temporarily did just that.
Christopher and "Lift and Strike"
Christopher’s primary assignment was to submerge foreign policy to allow 
Clinton to focus on America’s domestic policy, and in that regard, Christopher did not 
fail the president. However, by not pressing Clinton to take a stronger stance against 
Serbian aggression, Christopher failed the other component of his assignment: to 
adequately protect the president’s domestic policy from distraction by the foreign arena. 
While the Clinton Administration’s decision to withdraw from its tough 1992 campaign 
rhetoric allowed Clinton to remain focused on his domestic platfonn, it did so only 
temporarily. The conflict in Bosnia would continue to spiral out of control, causing great 
damage to the administration’s foreign policy legacy, and eventually risking Clinton’s 
1996 reelection chances. The administration would be forced to take a great political 
gamble to force peace onto the region, in turn not only threatening its domestic agenda 
with a “risky foreign policy initiative,” but joining the future of the presidency to the fate 
of Bosnian peace. Christopher had been chosen precisely because he lacked the vision 
and initiative which would have forced Clinton to create a robust foreign agenda. In the 
end, this was a mistake, such vision would have recognized how a failed Bosnia policy 
threatened the entire presidency.
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Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
Although he had been consistently opposed to an activist intervention in the 
Balkans, of the three members of Clinton’s foreign policy triad, Aspin played the most 
minor role in moving the Clinton Administration away from the "Lift and Strike" 
policy.*"*** While his inability to help his fellow policy advisers create the clear consensus 
the president wanted before acting has already been noted, it was in his relations with his 
military counteiparts in the Pentagon where Aspin most damaged the administration’s 
drive towards intervention. Though well versed in defense issues. Les Aspin was a poor 
fit for his role as secretary of defense. His unsuitability for the job left Clinton without an 
intermediary able to bridge the deep cultural and policy gaps between himself and the 
Pentagon, a fact further compounded by Colin Powell’s strong professional distaste for 
Aspin. As a result, the Clinton Administration found its leverage over the Pentagon 
further reduced, increasing the difficulty of gaining the militaiy’s support for "Lift and 
Strike.”
In his memoir, Colin Powell accepted that Aspin possessed a brilliant mind and 
had a strong command of defense issues, but criticized his organizational skills, 
inarticulate nature, and sloppy appeai ance, concluding that he had been miscast as 
secretary of defense.*"** When asked his opinion about Aspin’s candidacy for secretary 
prior to his appointment, Powell warned Clinton that, “smart’s not everything in running 
the Pentagon... Les might not bring quite the management style you’re looking fbr.”*"*^ 
However, Clinton ignored the General, placing a man whom Powell had described as a
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“former adversary” into the top civilian role at the Pentagon.*"*^
As a result, the Clinton Administration’s politico/military relations started poorly 
and Aspin never gained the respect of the nation’s top generals. This problem was 
compounded by both Aspin’s attempts to reorganize and cut the military’s budget 
thi*ough his highly unpopular Bottom Up Review (BUR), as well as by the 
administration’s highly misguided decision to make integiating homosexuals into the 
military its first policy proposal. In turn, the joint chiefs of staff began its relationship 
with Aspin in an adversarial role fi*om which it would not recover.
Thus, the administration lacked an honest broker to maintain good working 
relations with the military. Had Clinton appointed a secretary with a stronger reputation 
within the halls of the Pentagon, finding a military solution that was supported both by 
the Pentagon and the administration may have been possible. However, much like with 
Christopher, Aspin was appointed primarily because he had been extremely helpful 
during the campaign, and also because he championed a reorganization of the military 
which would cut its budget, in turn creating resources to be used to help the domestic 
economy.*"*"* This would damage the administration’s hopes of gaining popular support 
for "Lift and Strike.” As will be shown in subsequent sections on the role o f the 
Pentagon, the military’s opposition was influential in Congress which in turn was highly 
influential to administration policy. Had Les Aspin been a better fit for his role as 
secretary, it is possible the Clinton Administration would have had greater influence over 
the Pentagon’s strong opposition.
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National Security Adviser Anthony Lake
Unlike Aspin and Christopher, NSA Anthony Lake was not a poor choice for his 
position. A leading expert in the field of international relations possessing strong 
academic credentials and extensive bureaucratic experience. Lake was capable of 
redesigning American foreign policy following the Cold War. However, even though the 
US lacked a successor to its guiding policy of Containment, Lalce was not afforded the 
presidential attention or mandate to undertake a reconstruction of American foreign 
policy during this period. In fact, it would not be until months after the administration’s 
failure to gain support for "Lift and Strike" that Clinton would give Lalce’s nascent policy 
successor, “Enlargement,” its necessary presidential attention. As a result, without well 
defined goals for American foreign policy, it became difficult to place Bosnian 
intervention into a context of American national interest. Without such a declaration, it 
became increasingly difficult to convince various domestic actors to support the Balkans 
intervention. Though Lake felt Bosnia was an important issue in which the US should 
engage itself, he womed about an expansive Bosnia policy distracting firom what he 
perceived were the major items of the post-Cold War foreign policy agenda: Russia and 
Japan. Thus, Lake deserves credit for strengthening Clinton’s hand on Bosnia during the 
campaign, and helping to press him to attempt to gain European support for the policy in 
May 1993. But, as a result of Clinton not giving foreign policy the necessary attention it 
deserved, outside of his role as a member of the foreign policy triad. Lake failed to 
strongly influence the president’s Bosnia policy.
According to Sarkesian, “To develop coherent policy and relevant strategy 
requires articulation of what the US stands for and a national will and political resolve to
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use the instruments necessary to achieve national security goals.” Although Clinton 
assumed the presidency at an uncertain time of foreign policy flux, he did not make 
creating a successor to Containment an important aspect of his agenda. In one example 
of his failure to give sufficient attention to reforming America’s foreign policy goals, his 
inauguration speech included a mere 141 words on the topic of America’s international 
policy, and lacked any articulation of the new direction for American policy.*"*  ^ While 
Lalce scrambled behind the scenes to create a new direction for policy, he was hampered 
by the president’s public focus on domestic affairs, and Warren Christopher’s failure to 
advocate for a strong foreign policy at the expense of the administration’s domestic goals. 
Assigned to “submerge” American foreign policy at a time when it required the greatest 
presidential focus in fifty years, foreign policy was not given the sort of presidential 
attention which characterized Truman’s approach to the international arena following 
World War II. As a result, while the administration would set its policy goals on course 
by late 1993, through May 1993 there had been no distinct presidential articulation of the 
new direction of American policy. Without this articulation, it became impossible to fit a 
risky Balkans intervention into the context of national interest that democracies tend to 
require before intervening in foreign conflicts.
Even without such a public presidential pronouncement. Lake had distinct goals 
for the new direction of American foreign policy, and understood how a Balkans 
intervention could be a means to those ends. He had felt that the US had a responsibility 
to protect human rights norms in the Balkans fi om the time of the 1992 campaign when
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he had helped to strengthen Governor Clinton’s stance on the conflict.*"*  ^ Lake both 
believed that America had security interests in Bosnia, and was also deeply affected by 
the Serbian atrocities there, and fought for a stronger policy from the early days of the 
administration.*"*^ While he also believed that the US should not force a Bosnian peace at 
the expense of its other essential foreign policy goals, namely strengthening Russian 
democracy and recapturing a competitive trade balance with Japan, Lake remained a 
consistent advocate of the "Lift and Strike" policy during the meetings of the foreign 
policy triad. *"*^ However, part o f a foreign policy team which had been relegated to 
second status by Clinton’s domestic policy goals, and having shunned the spotlight in 
deference to Christopher, who he felt should be the chief mouthpiece of American 
foreign policy. Lake failed to make a strong impact outside o f the intra-administration 
policy foimulation process. While Lake advocated for a stronger policy when given the 
opportunity during meetings of the policy triad, he was not proactive in seeking to 
strengthen Clinton’s policy at the expense of America’s other goals, and in that the 
foreign policy triad failed as a unit to capture a great deal of presidential attention, he was 
marginalized as an important force in the "Lift and Strilce" debate.
The Triad and "Lift and Strilie"
In their own capacities as advisors, and as a policy triad unit, Clinton’s key 
foreign policy advisers’ failure to execute their intended policy roles played a strong role 
in pushing Clinton away from the "Lift and Strike" policy. As a unit the triad failed to 
give the president the sort of consensus he required to make a decision, though much of
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this blame could also be levied against Clinton for not taking a more active role in the 
policy process. Individually, each of the members failed in some way to push the 
president towards supporting the activist policies he had articulated during the campaign, 
though this failure as well owes much to Clinton’s expectations for their roles as 
secretary, and, in Lake’s case, Clinton’s failure to support the necessary redesign of 
American foreign policy.
In that both Lake and Christopher were charged with protecting the president 
from involvement in the foreign arena, their successes also pushed Clinton away from 
"Lift and Strike,” and hurt the formulation of sound foreign policy. With both Lake and 
Christopher focused on the needs of Clinton’s domestic agenda, American foreign policy 
was without sufficient advocates in the administration. A president is best served when 
his advisors each fight for the promotion of their individual policy spheres. In the case of 
Clinton’s early foreign policy triad, by assigning them to protect American domestic 
policy, the importance of a robust foreign agenda was overlooked, derailing the 
administration’s activist Bosnia policy in the process.
Further, this success did not prove lasting. By protecting Clinton from 
distractions by the foreign arena, the triad, but especially Christopher, would place the 
administration in the difficult position it would find itself by August 1995, when it 
became necessary to embark on Richard Holbrooke’s daring diplomatic assault on the 
Balkan leaders, culminating in the Dayton Accords. While the administration’s 
negotiated peace became the foreign policy highlight of its first term, a failure in Dayton 
could have badly damaged Clinton’s chances for reelection. The results of protecting the 
domestic arena fr om interference by the foreign arena were only temporary, it was almost
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that same foreign arena which not only derailed Clinton’s domestic agenda, but his hopes 
for reelection in 1996.
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Section II: 
The Pentagon
The Pentagon’s resistance to Clinton’s “Lift and Strike” policy played an 
important role in shifting the administration’s attempts away from its preferred strategy 
by May 1993. While it will not be suggested that the White House’s poor working 
relationship with its military advisers was the primary cause for the Pentagon’s distaste 
for Balkan intervention, the impact of the mutual mistrust between these two actors 
cannot be overlooked. Already reeling fi'om a series o f policy disagreements and the 
Pentagon’s subsequent suspicion of its commander-in-chief, Clinton could not afford to 
spend valuable political capital needed for his domestic agenda on gaining the military’s 
support for a risky Balkans intervention, nor, especially considering his lack of credibility 
in military issues, could he afford another public disagreement with America’s generals. 
Likewise, cautious of the various Clinton plans which Pentagon leaders felt threatened 
military preparedness and effectiveness, and buoyed by a series of small victories over 
the administration’s attempts to implement these measures, the Pentagon was predisposed 
to resist an intervention it felt unwise. Led in its attempts to keep Americans out of the 
fighting in Bosnia by General Colin Powell, who was widely hailed as a hero by 
Americans both in and outside o f the military, the Pentagon proved a formidable 
adversary when the administration sought to gain its support for “Lift and Strike.” 
Further, while some prominent militaiy advisers showed optimism during Congressional 
testimony that “Lift and Strike” would halt the fighting in Bosnia, this point of view was 
marginalized as it tended to represent traditional intra-military branch rivalries.
This section seeks to show how the Pentagon contributed to the administration’s
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policy shift by May 1993. It begins by outlining the various areas which led to the 
politico-military tensions complicating the execution of the strategy. Next, the important 
role of Colin Powell will be discussed by examining his perception of both the 
administration and the Yugoslav conflict. In turn, the influence o f the Powell Doctrine 
and the legacy of Vietnam on American Bosnia policy will be shown. Once these areas 
are understood, it will be possible to show the ways the Pentagon’s resistance of the 
administration’s policy contributed to its derailment.
Military Policy Conflicts
Wliile Clinton’s ideas for reorganizing, streamlining, and reorienting the focus of 
America’s military dovetailed nicely with his primary domestic policy goal of improving 
America’s struggling economy, they also directly threatened the Pentagon’s resources 
and traditions. Attempts to cut the military’s budget in real terms. Secretary of Defense 
Les Aspin’s plans to reorganize an institution traditionally resistant to change through his 
BUR, and the new foreign policy team’s widespread commitment to increasing American 
involvement in multilateral peacekeeping missions each were met with skepticism and 
criticism from the Pentagon’s top leaders. The primary policy drafts outlining these 
changes, the BUR and Presidential Review Directive 13 (PDR-13), which examined the 
American role in multilateral peacekeeping operations, created conflict between Clinton 
and the Pentagon even before his inauguration in January 1993.
The BUR, which aimed to eliminate duplication by realigning the roles and 
missions of the separate services, called for cuts in the number of army divisions, aircraft
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carriers, fighter wings, Marines, and nuclear f o r c e s . T h i s  plan attracted quick criticism 
from military leaders who accused it of being driven by budget considerations while 
ignoring military strategy. Then Chief Of Staff Army General Gordon Sullivan and 
Lieutenant Colonel James Dubik argued:
American political leaders expect the military to contract in both size and budget, 
contribute to domestic xQOOYQiy, participate in global stability operations, and 
retain its capability to produce decisive victory in whatever circumstances they 
are employed -  all at the same time... International and domestic realities have 
resulted in the paradox of declining military resources and increasing military 
missions, a paradox stressing our armed forces. The stress is significant.
Totally focused on the need to both balance the government’s fiscal budget and 
revive America’s economy, Clinton suggested not only realigning the roles and missions 
of the separate services, but spoke of the need to cut the military budget in real tenus as 
well.^^^ Even as Clinton was suggesting a $10 billion reduction in Pentagon spending, he 
sought to maintain the ability to intervene around the world, as suggested by PDR-13.
PRD-13 responded to Clinton’s goal of husbanding the nation’s resources for use 
in the domestic arena, and responded to his commitment to support and strengthen the 
UN as a means of maintaining order in the post-Cold War world. Similar to his 
campaign time proposals for creating an international Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), both
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PRD-13 and the BUR suggested that an increased American role in peacekeeping, when 
appropriate, would be beneficial to America’s post-Cold War foreign policy. The Senate 
confirmation hearings of both Warren Christopher, but especially UN Ambassador 
Madeline Albright, show that there was widespread adherence to this view among 
Clinton’s foreign policy team.^ "^^
Following the publication of the BUR, Colin Powell published his own report, in 
many ways a response to the incoming administration’s nascent plans for military 
reorganization, which rebuffed the consolidation of roles and missions of the separate 
services, and served as a warning to the administration that its plans for reorganization 
and cost cutting would likely produce a contentious battle with the Pentagon. Powell 
represented the view of many top military leaders when he argued that attempts to use 
America’s military for peacekeeping operations could draw it into another Vietnam-style 
quagmire and undermine its readiness for “real” combat o p e r a t i o n s . I n  Powell’s view, 
the military had but one purpose, “to fight and win America’s wars.”^^  ^ Thus, as Clinton 
entered office, it is not surprising that the military prepared to resist his plans to 
reorganize it, cut its budget, and deploy it on missions that it deemed inappropriate; 
national security bureaucracies often tend to resist any change that threaten their budget 
or authority as, at times, bureaucratic loyalty can overshadow policy priorities. This
conflict would be greatly exacerbated by Clinton’s decision to attempt a social 
reshuffling of the military, with the result that military leaders felt their new “draft- 
dodging foreign policy naïf’ commander-in-chief did not understand or respect their
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cherished institution/^^
Social Policy and Character Conflicts
Considering that overturning the age-old ban on homosexuals openly serving in 
the military was not only one of the lower priorities o f the Clinton Administration but 
even for gay-rights activists, the decision to make it the first policy proposal of the new 
administration seemed an odd one/^° The proposal not only faced an uphill struggle to 
alter the culture of an institution traditionally resistant to change, but also sent a stark 
message to the military that Clinton failed to understand their institution, and instantly 
created an adversarial relationship with the Pentagon’s top soldiers. The joint chiefs of 
staff, many of whom were furious that they learned of Clinton’s proposal not fiom the 
president himself but from a news article on the issue, opposed the new policy 
v i g o r o u s l y . I n  fact, during Defense Secretary Les Aspin’s first two meetings with the 
Chiefs, the issue so dominated the agenda that the emotional discussions left only a few 
moments to discuss international crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Iraq, causing some 
Pentagon aides to suggest that the joint chiefs uncharacteristically aggressive campaign 
to change the mind of the president bordered on insubordination. Though a 
compromise would be reached several weeks later, Clinton had laid the ground work for 
future conflict with the Pentagon. Many senior officers, including Powell, saw a proposal
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to impose such radical social change on the military as further evidence that Clinton, a 
president with no military background, did not understand the armed forces/
This perception was strengthened by accusations, which had followed Clinton 
since the early days of the 1992 campaign, that the military’s new commander-in-chief 
had dodged the Vietnam d r a f t / A s  Sarkesian explains:
Clinton’s avoidance of service in Vietnam was lightning-rod issue inside the US 
military, but it goes far beyond that, (as many professional government workers 
have not served in the military)... Such personal disassociation from the military 
weakened the ability... to make informed judgments about military issues, let 
alone influence military decision-maldng.
Even attempts by military leaders to pretend that such accusations did not alter 
their opinion of Clinton seemed faint-hearted. Colin Powell claimed in an underhanded 
comment that such criticisms, “did not bother me. By will of the American people, he 
was our commander-in-chief.” However, in the same paragraph, he juxtaposed their 
experiences in the 1960s by describing himself as a, “two tour veteran who had lost 
buddies in Vietnam, while Clinton was reading books at Oxford.” These claims did 
bother military leaders though; Clinton’s anti-Vietnam activities at Oxford University as 
well as the perception that he had dodged the Vietnam draft lay at the root of the difficult 
relationship between the commander-in-chief and his generals.
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Further contributing to the military’s distaste for Clinton was the wide circulation 
of rumors around Washington that neither Clinton nor his administration cared for the 
militaiy. In one oft-repeated anecdote, Powell’s assistant, the highly decorated soldier 
and future Clinton drug-czar Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, was told by a young 
White House staffer while walking tlirough the through the West Wing that, “We don’t 
talk to soldiers around here.”^^  ^ While one must treat with great skepticism Powell’s 
wording of the story, which begins with McCaffrey approaching the women using the 
overly friendly greeting of “Hello, there” and continues with the women replying with 
“an upturned nose,” there is little doubt to the veracity of his description that the, “young 
woman’s comment rocketed back to the Pentagon and whipped through the place like a 
free electron.”^^  ^ The effect of this story, as well as that of the military’s other criticisms 
of Clinton, could been seen even at the lowest levels o f the services. In one example, 
Clinton was treated with great disrespect by crew members when he visited an aircraft 
caiiier during the early months of his presidency.
There is little doubt that Clinton’s avoidance of military service, anti-Vietnam 
War activities, and policy to lift the ban on homosexuals openly serving in the military 
each complicated his worldng relationship with the Pentagon. Sarkesian argues that, 
“This resulted in a gap that many within the military believed had serious consequence 
for civil-military relations... For some, the military had become more of a social 
institution than a fighting institution.”^ T h e  traits of Clinton’s personal history, 
combined with his military organizational and social policy plans, created skepticism as
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to whether Clinton was fit to act as commander-in-chief and invited conflict with the 
military’s leaders from the first days of his presidency. These judgments about Clinton’s 
character and understanding of military issues would incite the leaders of America’s 
armed forces to resist his efforts at organizational and social restructuring, and carry over 
into the Pentagon’s evaluation of Iris activist Bosnia policy.
As one editorial in American Forces Journal International criticized:
Although the majority of the American public had only recently come to realize 
that their president plays loose with the truth and has a proclivity for inducing 
others to follow his lead with hair-splitting semantical obfuscation, America’s 
military forces have long seen evidence of those traits in their Commander in 
Chief. The US military involvement in Bosnia provides abundant illustration of 
both points.^^^
The Power of Powell
Colin Powell, not only in his capacity as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff at the 
start of the Clinton Administration, but also in regards to his high stature as the most 
famous and nationally respected American solider since Dwight Eisenhower, commanded 
almost universal respect in the arena of American national security policy. Had Powell 
been a passionate supporter of Clinton’s "Lift and Strike" policy, it is possible that an 
aggressive campaign to push for this intervention would have found sufficient support to 
enable its execution. Instead, Powell was both contemptuous of the new administration 
and a strong opponent of Bosnian intervention. Powell led the Pentagon’s resistance to 
“Lift and Strike,” ultimately contributing to the policy’s demise. Three important factors 
combined to predispose Powell to resist "Lift and Strike": his lack of respect for, and in
John G. R o d s , “Commander-in-Chief Clinton: The Military Had Already Been Marched Down the 
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some cases dislike of, Clinton, his key advisers, and their policy goals, his poor 
understanding of the events occurring in Bosnia, and his well developed ideas about the 
limits of American military intervention, known as the Powell Doctrine.
Powell and the New Administration
Although I was a member of the team, I still felt a little like a skunlc at the picnic.
I had been up to my eyeballs in Reagan and Bush national security policies that 
were held in some disrepute by my new bosses... Lake... sat in the chairman’s 
seat, but did not drive the meeting... Christopher, lawyerlike, simply waited for 
his client group to decide what position he was to defend. Aspin... did not try to 
lead either, and when Aspin did speak, he usually took the discussion onto 
tangents to skirt the immediate issue... I had managed to adjust to the looser 
Bush-era approach, and I would somehow adapt to the Clinton style. But it was 
not going to be easy.^^^
Colin Powell not only rejected many of the new Clinton Administration’s policy 
goals, he was critical of many of his new colleagues, and like many in the military, had 
strong reservations about his new commander-in-chief. Never quite fitting into the new 
foreign policy team, and anxiously awaiting his retirement, Powell did not experience the 
sort of collegiality with the Clinton Administration officials that he did with his former 
colleagues in the Bush Administration.
Powell’s cautious skepticism towards Clinton at the start of his presidency were 
due to the personal history and policy goals which made Clinton unpopular with many 
members of the military. However, for Powell, especially in his capacity with the former 
administration, this matter seemed more personal. As chairman of the joint chiefs for 
George H. W. Bush, Powell had grown quite fond of the departing president, saying a 
few years later that George and Barbara Bush were, “exceptional people who will be
Powell, Mv American Joumev. 575.
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(my) close friends for life... (George Bush) had shown me kindness, loyalty, and 
friendship. I thought the world o f him and always will.”^^ '^  Powell even used space in 
his autobiography to blame the lackluster perfonuance of Bush’s presidential campaign 
partly on a thyroid medicine which caused a “slowing of the mental process,” affecting 
Bush’s verbal reasoning on the campaign trail. The imbalance of respect by Powell 
from one president to the next is encapsulated in this quote, describing the final day of 
the Bush presidency, Powell said, “The next day a young President, shaped by the sixties, 
took the torch from a man who had been the Navy’s youngest fighter pilot in the war 
years of the forties. I felt like a bridge spanning the Administrations and generations.”^^  ^
While it is not certain whether Powell harbored personal animosity towards Clinton for 
unseating a president whom Powell personally and professionally respected so greatly, it 
can be inferred that Powell was far less comfortable with his new commander-in-chief 
than his previous one.
Powell’s discomfort was exacerbated by Clinton’s push to integrate homosexuals 
into the armed forces. Powell had warned that instituting the policy so early in his 
presidency could damage Clinton’s credibility with the armed forces, and was 
disappointed when Clinton ignored him. His feelings about the new president, as well as 
a subtle comment on the quality of his character, can be inferred from this comment: “I 
felt increasingly disappointed that this issue [gays in the military] had been allowed to 
become to new administration’s first priority. I also thought I understood why. Bill 
Clinton had already backed off other campaign stands..
Powell, Mv American Joumev. 560. 
Powell, Mv American Joumev. 560. 
Powell, Mv American Joumev. 569. 
Powell, Mv American Joumev. 572.
79
As the quote at the beginning of this section suggests, Powell did not respect the 
abilities of his new foreign policy colleagues. Never overly impressed with any of his 
fellow principles, Powell reportedly once made a comment during an early meeting 
which offended Madeline Albright so deeply, he later made her a written apology. 
However, Powell had the greatest difficulty working with Les Aspin, his new civilian 
chief at the Pentagon.
Though he claimed to “like Aspin personally,” he was critical of skills as an 
administrator, again referring to the superior composition and functioning of the Bush 
Administration’s cabinet: “(Aspin) was immune to efficient organization, counting on 
his congressional staff to keep him fi*om hurtling off the rails... (He) was as disjointed as 
Cheney was well organized...” In fact, Aspin’s poor organizational skills were 
widely criticized, and Powell did suggest to Clinton prior to his appointment that Aspin 
was not an ideal candidate for the position. That Powell refers to Aspin as a former 
“adversary” in his autobiography helps explain that it was more than organizational skills 
that accounted for the a poor working relationship between the chairman of the joint 
chiefs and the secretary of defense. Powell entered his final months as chairman 
mistrusting Clinton, lacking respect for the new foreign policy team in general, and 
believing so strongly that the new secretary of defense was miscast that he made early 
attempts to derail his appointment. Powell was so uneasy about his new working 
conditions that he made two separate attempts to retire early, both of which Clinton
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politely rejected/^* There is little evidence that Powell respected either Clinton or any of 
his new colleagues enough to defer to them on their Bosnia policy of choice. However, 
lack of collegiality was not the only reason Powell would resist the direction of the 
Clinton Administration’s activist policy.
Powell’s Understanding o f  Bosnia
While its effect cannot be overestimated, Powell’s poor conception of the conflict 
in Bosnia also may have influenced his resistance to an activist policy there. At the start 
of the administration much of the foreign policy team shared Clinton’s conception of the 
Balkan conflict. This point of view saw the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Milosevic’s 
Serbs of the rump Yugoslavia, attempting to carve up Bosnia in the interest of creating a 
“Greater Serbia.” While ethnic animosities did inflame the situation in Bosnia, the root 
of the conflict was political, and was driven primarily by Milosevic and Tudjman as they 
attempted to enlarge their republics at the expense of their neighbors. However, writing 
in 1995, Powell describes the conflict in a much different way. “Serbs living in Bosnia, 
backed by an newly independent Serbia, started fighting to foreclose a Muslim- 
dominated state... In Bosnia, we were dealing with an ethnic tangle with roots reaching 
back a thousand years.”
This lack of understanding, considering Powell’s access to information as 
chaiiman of the joint chiefs and the benefit of hindsight, is alarming if one assumes that 
Powell was not in fact trying simplify the description of the conflict for his readers. First, 
Serbia was not “newly independent,” and it would not become so for several years after
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1995. Second, by “Serbia” Powell must have been referring to “Yugoslavia.” But, 
Yugoslavia was not “independent” of anything, and in fact was the state fighting to keep 
the Serb-dominated union intact. While Bosnia did have a majority of Muslims, it was 
never “dominated” by them. Its government had a long tradition of representation by all 
Yugoslav ethnic groups. The tragedy of Bosnia lies in that its tradition of unity and inter­
racial acceptance was shattered by the destructive pogrom of Milosevic and the Bosnian 
Serbs. Finally, while ethnic animosities always have roots which stretch backwards in 
time for centuries, and the Balkan brand of hatred was particularly loiown for its focus on 
events as far back as the Crusades, the “ethnic tangle” was not the root of this conflict. 
While it was not necessary for Powell to understand the roots or complexities of the 
Balkan conflict to give competent military counsel to a president, that such an inaccurate 
and jumbled one-paragraph description of the Bosnian conflict came from the member of 
Clinton’s foreign policy team most opposed to American intervention in the Balkans is 
unsettling. Thus, one must question the sources which informed Powell’s resistance to an 
activist policy.
The Powell Doctrine and the Vietnam Syndrome
Powell’s well defined views on the use of military force to back political goals 
were the primary stumbling block to gaining the chairman’s support for "Lift and Strike.” 
The Powell Doctrine, as it is often called, is primarily a corollary to the Weinberger 
Doctrine, which stresses the importance of committing US forces only when a vital 
national interest is at stake, using military power in the interest of clearly defined political 
and military objectives, and deploying American troops only when there is sustained
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support from America’s elected representatives and its p u b l i c / L i k e  Weinberger, 
Powell’s ideas developed in response to America’s military and political mistalces during 
the Vietnam War. Powell expanded the Weinberger Doctrine by arguing that military 
action should have decisive results, and therefore should require the deployment of 
decisive force. For Powell, no intervention should be “limited,” for such a lack of 
commitment invites a lack of results.
In examinations of American military interventions over the previous thirty years, 
authors often refer to the “Vietnam Syndrome,” suggesting that the lessons of Vietnam 
are instrumental, sometimes overly so, in determining America’s subsequent policy 
decisions. While lessons from Vietnam did play an important role in influencing the 
decisions of actors as they determined their stances on "Lift and Strike,” one cannot 
simply point to the “Vietnam Syndrome” and automatically understand how the legacy of 
Vietnam is still viable today. While assessing the impact of Vietnam, one must also 
determine for which concept “Vietnam” is a shorthand abbreviation. In fact, it will be 
ai'gued through the course of this work that at least three strains of the Vietnam 
Syndrome influenced Clinton’s Bosnia policy. The first, the Pentagon strain, argued 
against intervention without clear political and military objectives, and warned against 
the “limited” use of power to achieve results.
Powell’s view towards a Bosnian intervention stemmed from his doctrine for the 
use of American military force and the lessons of Vietnam. While “Lift and Strike” may 
have seemed an “activist” American policy for Bosnia in comparison to the Bush 
Administration’s policy, it hardly assured an end to the fighting in Bosnia. In fact, "Lift
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and Strike" was little more than the best option available to a foreign policy team which 
could not engage in a full scale war in the Balkans, but still needed to “do something” to 
try and stop the killing. While Powell empathized with their desire to stop the slaughter, 
he also thought that ending the war in Bosnia could require a great deal of military force, 
and was not worth a high cost in American lives. As well, “Lift and Strike” would 
engage the American military in an intervention without a clear or obtainable political or 
military objective, risking the same sort of unintended escalation that had characterized 
the American presence in Vietnam.
“So you bet I get nervous when so-called experts suggest that all we need is a 
little surgical bombing or a limited attack,” Powell wrote in a New York Times editorial. 
“When the desired result isn’t obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with 
talk o f a little escalation. [History] has not been kind of this approach... [The military 
has] learned the lessons of history, even if [those calling for intervention] have not.” ^^ ^
For Powell, the conflict in the Balkans seemed too intractable for limited bombing 
attacks to have a high probability of success, and from his formative experience in 
Vietnam, he represented the view of many military officials who were only prepared to 
support missions which promised to achieve their objectives. His philosophy on 
intervention called for an initial induction of overwhelming force, but also required the 
sort o f expansive engagement that Clinton would never have been willing to order. 
Without such deployment, Powell feared an unintended escalation of American 
involvement in the conflict. During early cabinet meetings in which his colleagues 
pushed for "Lift and Strike,” Powell would question, “What is the end point?... If we
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bomb Serb military targets in Bosnia and that doesn’t bring them to the conference table, 
then what?”^^  ^ When Aspin once responded, “Then we’ll try something else,” Powell 
retorted by paraphrasing a remark made by General George Patton Jr. explaining, “When 
you put your hand to the thing, make sure that thing works.”^^ ^
While he would have never supported an intervention that risked an unintended 
slide into a war resembling Vietnam, Powell’s lack of confidence in his colleagues and/or 
Clinton only exacerbated this fear. Powell’s short tenure as chairman under Clinton had 
been marred by the president’s poor control of the policy agenda, tendency to ignore the 
advice of his military advisers, appointment of unsuitable members of the foreign policy 
team, and tendency not to follow on through on policy proposals when faced with 
resistance. Remembering the last great military intervention by a liberal Democrat, 
certain that Clinton Icnew little of either war or military affairs, concerned that "Lift and 
Strike" could suck policymakers into a Balkan quagmire, and believing that neither 
Clinton nor his cabinet understood the risks inlierent in such an intervention, Powell 
resisted Clinton’s Balkans policy.
Clinton’s Pentagon Conflicts, Powell, and Bosnia
The Pentagon played two important roles in influencing Clinton to abandon "Lift 
and Strike." First, during the administration’s early days, Powell stalled the initial push 
towards intervention. Second, when "Lift and Strike" was revisited in May 1993, high- 
ranlcing Pentagon officials testified to Congress on the poor likelihood for a successful 
intervention in the Balkans. While there were some disagreements, these tended to
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respect traditional intra-military rivalries, and the dissent in support of intervention was 
mostly discounted by members of Congress. The Pentagon’s largely pessimistic 
prospects for the success of "Lift and Strike" may have created doubt in the minds of 
many actors whose support of "Lift and Strike" would be essential for its implementation, 
including the American public, Congress, and even Clinton himself.
Stemming the Early Intervention Push
The. joint chiefs of staff, led by Powell, had been opposed to military engagement 
in the Balkans even during the Bush Administration. Questioning the potential success of 
State Department proposals to use limited force against the Serbs or police the no-fly 
zone from Serbian aircraft, Powell stated unambiguous opposition to Bosnian 
intervention even before the 1992 election, and suggested that the civilians calling for 
force were, “the same folks who have stuck us into problems before that we have lived to 
regret.” Taken in consideration with Powell’s lack of collegiality and respect for the 
new administration, it is little wonder that he opposed "Lift and Strike" fi-om the earliest 
days of Clinton’s presidency.
Powell’s objection to "Lift and Strike" was clear: unless Clinton and his advisers 
could identify the political and military objectives on an intervention, Powell would 
oppose one. Thus, he opposed not only "Lift and Strike", but any suggestion that 
resembled a new push to use the military for limited objectives.
“The debate exploded at one session when Madeline Albright... asked me in 
frustration, ‘What’s the point in having this superb military that you’re always talking
Michael R. Gordon, “Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Use of Force in Bosnia,” The New York 
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about if we can’t use it?’ I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GI’s were not 
toy soldiers to be moved around some sort of global board.” Powell doubted that an 
intervention would succeed, feared it could bog down American fighting forces, and 
worried about the Clinton foreign policy team’s desire to expand the use of American 
military forces for frequent peacekeeping operations. As Clinton’s foreign policy triad 
failed to outline the political and military objectives a secure Bosnia achieved for 
American foreign policy, and in turn Clinton failed to articulate those objectives to both 
Powell and the American people, Powell opposed any intervention in Bosnia during the 
first months of 1993. Unwilling to create another public conflict with the military, 
uncertain of his own military and security policy credentials, uninterested in making the 
primary focus of his early administration a foreign intervention, and similarly concerned 
about allowing an American intervention force to become bogged down in a Balkan 
quagmire, Clinton allowed Powell to contribute to his decision to abandon his early plans 
for a Balkan intervention.
Doubts from Congressional Testimony
When the Clinton Administration reconsidered the "Lift and Strike" policy in 
early May 1993, top generals engaged in an unusually public debate before Congress 
over its probability for success. In turn, many of these generals’ pessimistic predictions 
raised doubts in the minds of Congress, Clinton, and the American public that such an 
intervention could succeed. Lieut. Gen. Barry McCaffrey argued that using air strikes to 
stop the Serbs would “be quite a severe challenge for the use of air power,” and Admiral 
David Jeremiah argued that the attacks would lead to both allied losses and civilian
Powell, Mv American Joumev. 576.
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damage/^^ Further, these commanders all but negated the optimistic testimony of Air 
Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, who, touting the new capabilities of 
precision guided weapons, testified that bombing the Bosnian Serb gun positions posed 
“virtually no risk” to American pilots. Citing their experience in the Vietnam war, 
ground and naval commanders argued that such claims were exaggerated. Even more 
deflating for proponents of air strikes may have been the testimonies of Maj. Gen. 
Michael Ryan of the Air Force and Maj. Gen. John Sheehan of the Marines, who argued 
that while strikes could initially damage the Serbian war machine, the Serbs would 
quickly camouflage their artillery, and only the induction of follow-up ground forces 
could assure success. Though the divisions between proponents and opponents of air 
strikes against the Serbs mirrored traditional institutional divisions in the armed services, 
the strong skepticism towards the plan by many military advisers must have alarmed the 
administration’s more careful policy makers.
In fact, some argue that the military used those hearings to assure that sufficient 
doubt existed over the probability of "Lift and Strike" that lawmakers would eventually 
opt not to attempt the policy. Former Yugoslavian Ambassador Zimmermann argued, 
“The Pentagon’s tactic was never to say no, simply to raise the objections which made 
the proposal seem unworkable.”^^  ^ The stance of many military leaders was clear in a 
confidential high-level Pentagon cable to the British Ministry of Defense during this 
period which simply pleaded, “Save us from ourselves.”
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The Role of the Pentagon
The Pentagon’s role in pushing the Clinton Administration away from “Lift and 
Strike” during this period is important, though complementary. While Powell and the 
Pentagon’s top generals may have been predisposed to resist the policy, both in their 
professional capacity as soldiers and in the bureaucratic defense of their institutional 
interests, their impressions of Clinton and disdain of his early Pentagon policies must 
have also raised their doubts as to his suitability to be commander-in-chief, further 
strengthening their opposition to “Lift and Strike.” While the Pentagon did not stonewall 
Clinton as the European allies did, nor did it fail him as his foreign policy triad had, the 
military was nonetheless an important voice during the intervention debate. That voice 
was clear in its apprehension over using the military for missions other than war and 
pessimistic in its assessment that "Lift and Strike" would achieve its objective, suggesting 
instead that American soldiers would be trapped in a Balkan quagmire. In turn, these 
opinions influenced Congress, the American public, and Clinton, each of whom played 
important roles in sidelining "Lift and Strike".
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Section III:
Congress
Two types of Congressional influence on the Clinton Administration’s Bosnia 
policy can be identified during this period. First, the combination of Congressional 
opposition to intervention, US presidents’ decreasing control of foreign policy making, 
Clinton’s weak influence over Capitol Hill during the early days of his presidency, and 
several looming domestic policy struggles with Congress made gaining Congressional 
support for "Lift and Strike" too politically costly, and perhaps, ultimately unsuccessful. 
As a result, the administration made no serious attempt to gain the legislature’s support 
for intervention during the first months of 1993. Second, when the administration 
revisited intervention in May 1993, Congressional leaders, responding to Pentagon 
divisions over the possible success o f "Lift and Strike” and influenced by the 
Congressional strain of the “Vietnam Syndrome,” made clear the high risks a military 
failure in Bosnia would pose to Clinton’s presidency. The high risk of intervention to 
Clinton’s domestic agenda directly contribute to the decision to abandon the policy.
The Decision not to Lobby Congress
The Clinton Administration was restrained from lobbying Congress to back the 
"Lift and Strike" policy during the early weeks of the presidency. As a result, without 
widespread support for unilateral intervention from either the Pentagon or the American 
public, the administration’s failure to gain a Congressional endorsement of "Lift and 
Strike" further weakened Clinton’s mandate to engage in an activist intervention in the 
Balkans. Several factors limited the administration’s ability to rally Congressional
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support for its campaign-time strategy.
Congressional influence in the formulation of foreign policy had been growing 
steadily since Vietnam, and, with the end of the Cold War, had increased sufficiently to 
pose a serious threat to any Clinton plan to pressure Congress to support "Lift and Strike" 
against its wishes. A trend had existed for many years in which the president, who often 
preferred the formulation o f foreign policy over that o f domestic policy, almost always 
found Congressional support for his foreign policy agenda. This pattern, best known in 
its articulation as Aaron Wildavsky’s “Two Presidencies Thesis,” suggested that, due to 
the need to protect America during the Cold War, “since World War II presidents have 
had greater success in controlling the nation’s defense and foreign policy than in 
dominating its domestic policies.”^^  ^ However, by Clinton’s inauguration, the trend had 
been slowing for some thirty years, and even while the executive branch had often 
prevailed, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Bush had all experienced difficulty in gaining 
Congressional support for unpopular foreign policies. In fact, by the end of the Cold 
War, Wildavsky and Duane Oldfield had published a formal obituary for the “Two 
Presidencies Thesis,” preferring to credit an epiphenomenon of Cold War bipartisan 
consensus in foreign policy over presidential power as the reason for Congressional 
acquiescence.^^* In fact, the new security environment which formed following the end 
of the Soviet threat restricted presidential latitude for creating foreign policy, instead 
reducing it to better resemble presidential influence over domestic policy. As Leaver 
explained:
Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” Transaction 4 (December 1966) 8., as cited in Steven A. 
Shull The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Centurv Assessment (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1991) 11-25.
Peter Feaver, “The Domestication of Foreign policy,” American Foreign Policv Interests 20.1 (1998) 2.
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In the past secondary issues were linlced to the primary issues, the Soviet threat, 
and this gave the President leeway to formulate policy. Now secondary issues 
look like secondary issues, the President’s freedom of action is circumscribed 
accordingly. Other policymakers are more willing to challenge the President 
because they can afford to do so. Since the unifying glue of a dramatic threat to 
national security... has lost its adhesive quality, foreign policymaking resembles 
the pulling and hauling of special interests, the balancing of secondary tradeoffs, 
and the cutting of deals -  in short, domestic policy.
Therefore, as Congress had reasserted influence over the formulation of US 
foreign policy, Clinton would have to gain Congressional support for "Lift and Strike" 
before engaging in the Balkans. Any attempt not to do so would have invited the same 
sort of stem Congressional lectures on its Constitutional power to declare war that 
George H. W. Bush wisely avoided by bringing the decision to engage in the first Persian 
Gulf War to a vote on Capitol Hill. While Bush had sold his Gulf War strategy to 
Congress, and had used the UN to bring international pressure onto individual members, 
Clinton lacked a strong sense of his "Lift and Strike" policy, which the UN actually 
opposed.^®® Thus, for Clinton to gain Congressional support, an intense lobbying of 
Congress would have been necessary. Three important factors convinced the 
administration not to engage in such an effort.
Strong Congressional Aversion
If lobbying Congress for support for foreign intervention had become more 
difficult for presidents under most circumstances, gaining Congressional support for such 
an unpopular Bosnian intervention in 1993 seemed highly unlikely. Though much of the 
Congressional leadership supported an activist intervention, and while bipartisan
Feaver, “Domestication,” 4.
Lance T. LeLoup and Steven A. Shull, The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in 
National Policvmaldng (New York: Longman, 2003) 115.
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consensus at the highest levels is often sufficient to attract the support of ranlc-and-file 
legislators, so large were the numbers who opposed intervention, and so passionate their 
opposition, not even the cooperation of the Congressional leadership could assure 
Clinton’s success. For even while foreign policy luminaries such as Senators Bob Dole 
(R-KS), Joe Biden (D-DE), and George Mitchell (D-ME) supported "Lift and Strike", the 
policy’s Congressional detractors were too many. Emboldened by Pentagon skepticism 
over a successful intervention, Vietnam veteran John McCain (R-AZ), House Foreign 
Relations Committee chairman Lee Hamilton (D-IN), the normally hawkish Newt 
Gingrich (R-GA), and majorities o f both houses vocally opposed "Lift and Strike” during 
the first months of 1993. While some critics made stark comparisons of Bosnia to 
America’s experience in Vietnam, others demanded that the new “peace dividend” be 
used on domestic policy reform. Thus, as the fading of the “Two Presidencies Thesis” 
suggested that Clinton would have to lobby members of Congress directly to gain support 
for "Lift and Strike," Congress’s strong aversion to the idea of a Balkan intervention 
raised the costs o f its support; a substantial majority of Congress would have to be 
lobbied.
Clinton’s Weak Influence
This strong Congressional distaste for "Lift and Strike" was not helped by 
Clinton’s lack of influence on Capitol Hill. While not every president is as masterful at 
manipulating Congress as was Lyndon B. Johnson or Hany Truman, Clinton’s power to 
persuade Capitol Hill in early 1993 may have been the weakest of any president’s in 
modem history. Not only did Clinton find himself without many of the inherent
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advantages enjoyed by his predecessors while negotiating with Congress, but he 
squandered much of what political power remained through poor relations with members 
and misguided and mistimed policy attempts.
First, Clinton faced the complicated gap between expectations and reality. While 
expectations ran high for a Democrat entering office while his party controlled both 
houses of Congress, hope for sweeping domestic legislative change was unfounded. The 
Democratic majority produced by the 1992 election was neither large nor cooperative, 
and while Bush had risked little by ignoring a hostile Democratically controlled 
Congress, Clinton would be expected to produce legislative results with his party in 
control of both the executive and legislature.^^* However, Clinton found his Democratic 
majority, long acting as the opposition party and thus more skilled in obstructionism than 
in legislation, unwieldy.^*^  ^ Despite clear majorities in both houses, Clinton had no 
natural coalition for his domestic agenda.^®* Instead, for each issue Clinton had to cobble 
together a series of ad hoc groups to advance his policy goals. Further, while Clinton did 
receive support from many Democrats on important policy proposals, too many defectors 
either abandoned Clinton on important issues or extracted large concessions for their 
support.^ **"* In the most egregious example, much of the Democratic Congressional 
leadership led the fight against the passage of NAFTA in September 1993, and Clinton 
found himself personally lobbying more than a third of Congress by phone in the hours
Kenneth E. Collier, Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs (Pittsburgh, 
PA: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1997) 260., Feaver, “Domestication,” 6.
Collier, Between the Branches. 260.
James P. Pfiffher, “President Clinton and the 103*^  ^Congress: Winning Battles and Losing Wars,” 
James A. Thurber (ed.), Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations (Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1996) 171.
^  Pfiffher, “President Clinton,” 185.
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leading to the vote/*^^ Specific policy proposals were not the only source of poor 
Democratic party discipline.
Not only did Clinton’s policy agenda lack a clear mandate from voters in the 1992 
election, but so did Clinton, a point driven home by Bob Dole when he appeared on 
television only hours after the election to point our that a majority of voters had chosen 
either Bush or Perot.^ **^  That the Democrats lost a modest number of seats in both houses 
further highlighted the flimsy Democratic mandate to govern, and suggested that the 
completion of Clinton’s domestic agenda would have little impact on the reelection of 
individual members, be they Democrat or Republican.^*^^ Furthermore, because of 
Perot’s third party candidacy, Clinton was actually outpolled in Congressional districts by 
all but five incoming members of Congress, suggesting that Clinton’s coattails had 
helped elect no Democrat, thus further reducing members’ loyalty to him and his policy 
agenda.^ *^ *
Theorists examining the relationship between the president and Congress have 
often suggested that presidential popularity as political capital undergirds Congressional 
support. A popular president is more likely to gain support for specific policies than an 
unpopular one.^ **^  Clinton was not a popular president. Entering office with an approval 
rating which would stay near or below 50% for much of his first months in office,
Clinton was unable to use his standing in the polls to push legislation through
205 pfjffner, “President Clinton,” 184.
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Congress?^^ Further, America’s opinion of Clinton seemed to fluctuate constantly, and if 
confronted by a popular Clinton, lawmakers merely had to wait for his next downturn in 
the polls to slow his legislative agenda.^ ^ ^  Combined with a poorly constituted 
Congressional Liaison Office, which Clinton used as a device to bring diversity to the 
White House staff and reward campaign workers, the White House lacked both the 
national popularity and the day-to-day interaction with Congress that allows presidents to 
create an effective strategy for achieving legislative results. Presidents may overcome 
some of these inherent disadvantages by aggressively pushing legislation through 
Congress during the initial honeymoon, but Clinton’s mistakes during that period further 
weakened his influence on Capitol Hill.
The Honeymoon
The notion of a presidential honeymoon is that there is a small window of time 
following the inauguration during which presidents have the highest chance of 
convincing Congress to adopt their policy goals. James Pfiffher has written of the need 
for presidents to “hit the ground running,” and Paul Light argues that presidents must 
“move it or lose it” to push the legislative agenda with Congress quickly before their 
influence is reduced.^*^ Had Clinton used the honeymoon to push for Congressional 
support of "Lift and Strike,” he may have been successful, but poorly timed legislative 
attempts and embarrassments over cabinet appointments squandered this period, further 
weakening Clinton’s influence on Capitol Hill.
Pfiffner, “PresidentClinton” 187.
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While Clinton’s economic plan was the highlight of his campaign-time agenda, 
and would have been a wise proposal to push through Congress during his honeymoon, 
disagreements between Clinton and his economic team delayed the presentation of a 
cohesive economic plan until late February. Instead, the first days of the 103^ Congress 
were dominated by Clinton’s mistimed proposal to integrate homosexuals into the armed 
services, and a series of attorney-general nominations who embarrassed the White House 
with their record of hiring illegal immigrant namiies. While rows over Clinton’s first two 
choices for attorney-general distracted Clinton from engaging in substantive policy 
debates with Congress and the nation, the White House’s failure to sufficiently vet 
prospective members of the cabinet was, in the end, nothing more than an 
embarrassment. The issue of gays in the military was much more damaging, and all but 
ended Clinton’s presidential honeymoon.
Not only did Clinton’s decision to press the gays issue play into the stereotype 
that he was a national security naïf, but it put the nascent administration in the position of 
advancing a tremendously unpopular proposal without sufficient Congressional support, 
and over the objections of Colin Powell, one of the most popular Americans in modem 
times.^^^ This risk backfired, and the failure to achieve a legislative victory on the issue 
greatly damaged Clinton’s clout on Capitol Hill. Not only had Congress been shown that 
it could force an embarrassing presidential retreat, even on a national security issue, but 
that Sam Nunn (D-GA) led the vocal opposition showed that Clinton not only lacked the 
normal institutional leverages for the formulation of foreign policy, but that he could not 
control members of his own party.^ "^^  These impressions were only strengthened a few
Feaver, “Domestication ” 6.
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weeks later when Clinton was reduced to calling newly elected junior committee 
members to lobby for particular amendments to bills relating to the stimulus package and 
budget? To some, that Clinton was already using his presidential coin during the 
honeymoon period, and in the most trivial o f circumstances, was a sign that he lacked any 
real clout on Capitol Hill. “Whoever heard of a president calling junior members of a 
committee on an amendment?” complained one staffer.^
Abandoning "Lift and Strike"
Congress’s adamant opposition to a Balkan intervention, Clinton’s lack of 
influence on Capitol Hill, and his futile squandering of his honeymoon period combined 
to malce Congressional cooperation almost impossible, and thus contributed to Clinton’s 
early decision to abandon the prospect of a military intervention. However, 
understanding that Clinton faced a decidedly uphill battle in gaining Congressional 
support for "Lift and Strike," does not fully reveal why Clinton did not press Capitol Hill 
for intervention. Like many decisions Clinton made concerning Bosnia, domestic policy 
considerations played a crucial role in the abandonment of "Lift and Strike."
All of Clinton’s inherent wealcnesses in working with Capitol Hill would have 
most likely combined to create a Congressional halt to intervention. Even if  Clinton had 
been successful in lobbying Congress for its support, the act of doing so surely would 
have weakened his presidential coin, and greatly damaged his ability to implement the 
domestic policy proposals that lay at the heart of his agenda and razor thin mandate. 
During the most crucial moments of Bosnia decision making, the specter of domestic
Collier, “Domestication,” 265.
Collier, “Domestication,” 265.
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policy always hung overhead. The battle over the stimulus package occurred just as 
Clinton opted to quite his talk of intervention in favor o f the European-led VOPP. The 
battle over the budget loomed as he abandoned "Lift and Strike" all together. Getting 
NAFTA passed a few months later would require massive amounts of Clinton’s direct 
participation, in order to overcome the anti-NAFTA opposition led by leaders from inside 
his party.
Though America had entered a post-Cold War era in which Congress was deeply 
involved in foreign policy formulation, and presidential participation in the lobbying 
effort had become essential for major proposals, Clinton was unwilling to use his limited 
influence in Congress to gain support for "Lift and Strike." Many factors limited the 
power of that influence, and mistakes made during the honeymoon both contributed to 
those limits, and squandered an oppoiiunity to gain quick support for key aspects of his 
domestic policy platform, perhaps opening the door for Clinton to lobby for Bosnia 
intervention. The large majority of his caiupaign promises had been made on issues in 
the domestic sphere, and with much of the Congress opposed to his domestic agenda, and 
without sufficient influence on Capitol Hill to assure its successful implementation, 
Clinton could not also lobby Congress to support a risky intervention in the Balkans.
Congress Raises the Risks: The Vietnam Syndrome’s Congressional Strain
As the killing in Bosnia continued through the spring of 1993, the administration 
began to revisit the "Lift and Strike" option. As well, the members of Congress who had 
always supported intervention became louder in their criticism of Clinton, keeping the 
issue alive in the political arena. Denouncing Clinton’s tacit support of the VOPP, Rep.
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Frank McCloskey (D - IN) declared as early as February, “More diplomacy is not going 
to stop genocidal aggression. It’s going to take military f o r c e . M c C l o s k e y  would be 
joined shortly by the highly influential Joe Biden who, after an independent fact finding 
mission to the region, presented the White House with a strongly worded letter 
castigating the administration for its “confusion and inertia” in responding to Serbian 
aggression.^^^ On the other side of the aisle Dole similarly authored a letter to the 
president warning that, “nothing short of the credible threat of military action will be 
sufficient to stop the Belgrade war machine.”^ P r e s s u r e  from these members, combined 
with behind-the-scenes maneuvering on the part of the Democratic Congressional 
leadership, formed a coalition willing to support a limited intervention in Bosnia by May 
1993.
These leaders reported to Clinton in early May that they could deliver bipartisan 
support for using military force in the Balkans, provided he explained the stakes to the 
American people, and as long as he understood that such support came with a caveat: 
once engaged, even under the cover of a multinational force, the world’s only superpower 
could not fail.^^  ^ Unlike the “old college try” approach supported by Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin, Congressional leaders warned that Clinton could not set the goal of 
saving the Muslims and then withdraw if  the costs of intervention became too great.^^  ^
“Several of us said the republic will survive, but the presidency will be badly damaged.
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and the standing and credibility of the US in the world will be damaged,” reported 
Hamilton?^^ Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) was more blunt, . .our advice was that the 
president was going to suffer substantially if  in fact this doesn’t work out well, that 
people will not be generous and he ought to anticipate that.”^^ ^
Congress had made clear the price of a Balkans intervention. Were "Lift and 
Strike" to fail, Clinton would face strong consequences both in Congress and with the 
American people, complicating his domestic agenda and all but assuring that he would 
lose controversial upcoming legislative battles such as the figlit over NAFTA. While 
"Lift and Strike" promised to cause UNPROFOR’s exodus, maldng any American 
intervention a unilateral one with scant public support. Congress now discarded Clinton’s 
one safety net which protected America from a quagmire: withdrawal. Again, in relation 
to the Vietnam Syndrome, this Congressional strain obsessed about the loss of America’s 
international prestige and the high costs of an American failure. Congressional leaders 
seemed determined not to let Clmton ruin America’s clout on the international stage.
Congress and "Lift and Strilce"
Since Congressional support was not the only hurdle to an intervention in Bosnia, 
though it is important to understand why Clinton chose not to lobby for "Lift and Strike" 
early in his presidency, doing so does not paint a complete picture of Clinton’s decision 
to abandon the policy. Of greater impact was the message Congressional leaders sent in 
the days leading up to Clinton’s final decision to abandon intervention. These leaders 
understood that while presidents often receive credit in the court of public opinion for
Sciolino, “Clinton on Serbs,” 1 May 1993. 
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trying but failing to push controversial domestic legislation through the legislature, such 
an approach with foreign policy was promiscuous engagement. As Feaver explains:
In domestic policy, the President gets political credit for engaging issues even 
when he knows he cannot resolve them and cannot commit the resources needed 
to address them seriously. In foreign policy, engaging and failing is worse than 
not engaging at all... and can be politically lethal. The principle currency in 
foreign policy is... credibility ... An ineffective crime bill is harmless because 
criminals do not decide to commit crimes based on the credibility o f the 
politicians who voted for the bill.^ "^^
This message was essential, because it exposed the essential weakness of 
Clinton’s dedication to an intervention: saving the Bosnians was not a high policy 
priority. Further, a failed intervention put at risk the implementation of Clinton’s 
domestic policy platform. Thus, while it is important to note that Congressional leaders 
raised the risks a failed intervention posed to Clinton’s presidency, one must also 
consider that they gave "Lift and Strike" their support. Such considerations help to malce 
clear the power of Clinton’s domestic agenda in derailing a possible intervention.
Feaver, “Domestication,” 6.
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Section IV:
The Media and American Public Opinion
The news media and American public opinion also played important roles in 
Clinton’s decision on his policy. First, the news media indirectly guided Clinton towards 
adopting the "Lift and Strike" policy during the 1992 campaign. In August 1992 
journalists brought the existence of Serbian death camps to the attention of a stunned 
world, and in turn became highly critical of President Bush’s muted policy towards the 
Serbs. This reporting, and the subsequent criticism of the Bush Administration’s 
response to the destruction of Bosnia, opened the door for candidate Clinton’s attack on 
Bush’s Balkans policy. The final evolution of this campaign-time critique would 
formulate the firamework of the "Lift and Strike" policy. Thus, the news media created 
the conditions in which Clinton chose to exploit a rare weakness in Bush’s foreign policy 
record. As a result, one can find a direct linlc between the shocking exposure of the 
camps, the subsequently poor Bush Administration reaction, and the formulation of 
Clinton’s over-expansive policy for the Balkans which, once in office and confironted 
with the realities of intervention, he would be forced to abandon. Second, many in the 
media failed to adequately understand the events in Bosnia, and overcompensated in their 
attempts to paint an impartial picture of the Balkan war. In turn, many issues which 
should have seemed more clear to actors influencing the Clinton Administration’s 
Balkans policy became muddied. This failure to better educate the public may have both 
pushed public opinion away fi'om intervention and allowed the Clinton Administration to 
recast its rhetorical description of the conflict by late spring 1993 to better match its 
reduced commitment to saving the Bosnians. Third, though public opinion tends to
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restrict policy instead of determine it, analysis will suggest that by supporting multilateral 
intervention but strongly opposing unilateral intervention the American public played an 
important role in pushing the Clinton Administration away from "Lift and Strike."
Pushing Clmton Towards "Lift and Strilce"
When Roy Gutman first reported on the “systematic slaughter” of Muslims and 
Croats by the Bosnian Serbs in his Newsday article “Death Camps,” the response of the 
international community was that of shock and disbelief.^^^ Four days later, Britain’s 
ITN negotiated access to the Serbian camps of Omarska and Tmopolje and captured 
video images of emaciated men caught behind barbed wire fences, evoking memories of 
cruelty not seen in Europe since the time of the Nazis. Both officials and journalists 
agreed that the images in the ITN video gave the story a power that it would have 
otherwise lacked, and the resulting reaction from other members of the media was 
intense.^ ^^
Faced with a barrage of questions as to what American policy would be in the 
face o f the wanton abuse of human rights, the Bush Administration made the critical error 
of devoting energy not towards addressing the human rights abuses themselves but 
towards the political problems created by the ITN images and the Gutman story.^^^ 
Similar to the Clinton Administration’s strategy months later, the Bush Administration 
initially acknowledged the camps, but officials carefully avoided casting the events in 
Bosnia as a genocide, an admission which, under international law, would have obliged
^  Vuliiamv. Seasons in Hell. 118.
Strobel, Late Brealdng Foreign Policy. 147. 
^  Strobel, Late Brealdng Foreign Policy. 147.
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America to take action?^^ “We do Icnow from our reports of information similar to the 
press reports that the Serb forces are maintaining what they call detention centers,.. and 
we do have our own reports ... that there have been abuses and torture and killings taking 
place in those areas,” admitted State Department spokesman Richard Boucher in a press 
conference immediately after the publication of the Omarska and Tmopolje accounts?^^ 
However, the Bush Administration, straggling to regain its falling popularity before the 
1992 election, could afford no foreign intervention with Americans so deeply concerned 
about domestic issues, and thus Boucher’s admission was not followed by the 
announcement of a policy change. This quiet acquiescence to events in Bosnia enraged 
the journalists in attendance, some o f whom fried fierce stories criticizing the Bush 
response. “I had rarely seen the State Department press corps -  or what was left of it in 
August ~ so agitated,” said one observer.^^^
The Bush Administration’s response was attacked during Assistant Secretary of 
State for European and Canadian Affairs Thomas Niles’s Capitol Hill testimony the 
following day. Niles, reeling from calls for the Bush Administration to undertake 
substantive action against the Serbs, backed away from Boucher’s statement. According 
to Niles, the existence of the camps had not actually been confirmed, and there was little 
the US could immediately do to investigate the atrocities.^^^ “We know there are camps 
and conditions at them are poor,” said one official familiar with the issue, “but we can’t 
substantiate systemic killings and won’t be able to anytime soon.”^^  ^ This denial of the 
existence of camps already shown on televisions across the world greatly weakened the
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aura of invincibility surrounding the Bush Administration’s foreign policy prowess. 
Quickly sensing that in Bosnia Bush faced a crisis for which he had no solution, and thus 
had finally become vulnerable to foreign policy criticisms during an election year. 
Democrats attacked the administration’s inconsistencies, and Niles’s poor performance 
was replayed on every major news channel that evening. “Either Mr. Boucher is lying or 
you are lying, but you are both working for Jim Baker,” Niles was told as he concluded 
his Congressional testimony.^^^
Clinton also recognized the opportunity Bush’s weak response provided and 
quickly joined the attack, finally allowing the governor to score rare foreign policy points 
at the height of the 1992 campaign. These criticisms were designed to bolster Clinton’s 
presidential campaign, and the result was the articulation of a strategy not easily 
compatible with the most important goals of his administration. Though the early 
firamework for "Lift and Strike" succeeded in highlighting the timidity of the Bush 
Administration, it also created a level of expectation for action that Clinton would be 
unable to meet once in office.
To underscore the failure of the callous Bush strategy, Clinton compared the 
events in Bosnia to the Holocaust, and declared that those responsible must be 
punished.^ '^^ Such rhetoric was supported by policy proposals which marked a radical 
departure fi'om Bush’s hands-off Balkans approach. Clinton prodded Bush to show “real 
leadership” in the Balkans, and made clear that the US should use force to open the Serb 
camps and consider lifting the arms embargo on the former republics of Bosnia and
Krauss, “US Backs Away,” 5 August 1992. 
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Croatia?^^ Though Clinton had finally distanced himself from Bush on a key foreign 
policy issue which remained at the forefront of public debate, this decision came at a 
heavy cost: not only had Clinton made several policy promises which would engage the 
US in the conflict in the Balkans, he had made clear that he perceived the Serb action as 
“genocide,” which brought moral and legal obligations for the US to intervene.
The impact of the Newsday article and ITN’s reporting cannot be ignored. First, 
they revealed the reality of Bosnia’s horror to a stunned world, changing completely 
outsiders’ conception of the conflict. Even more importantly for this research, these 
reports shifted the debate over American policy for the region, and, subsequently, the 
landscape of the 1992 campaign. For the Bush Administration, the reports made its 
policy of nonintei*vention untenable.^^^ Further, Bush’s response to these reports and the 
subsequently poor media reaction to the attempted denial of the camps by Thomas Niles 
left Bush vulnerable to intense criticism from all comers, especially from Clinton. 
Indirectly, the media had allowed the Democrats to attack Bush’s greatest strength: his 
foreign policy record.
By maximizing that opportunity to its fullest, Clinton also found himself deeply 
influenced by these media reports. Driven by media images firom Bosnia and focused on 
winning the 1992 campaign, Clinton used the opportunity the media afforded him by 
publishing the reports and subsequently attacking Bush’s response. Clinton had been 
searching for a way to showcase his skills in the foreign policy arena while 
simultaneously weakening Bush’s record. The media allowed him that chance, and in
For Sarajevo airport, see R.W. Apple Jr., B. Drummond Ayers Jr., Thomas L. Friedman, Steven 
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doing so Clinton backed many of the policy suggestions offered by the press, a strategy 
which dovetailed nicely with his hope to harm Bush as much as help his own campaign. 
However, by designing his approach for maximum value on the campaign trail, Clinton 
articulated a strategy which, though successful in highlighting the weakness of the Bush 
Administration’s Balkans policy, created expectations for Balkan activism which Clinton 
would spend the next years attempting to dampen. Thus, one may suggest that by placing 
President Bush in a vulnerable position, and affording Clinton a rare opportunity to 
criticize the strong foreign policy record of his opponent, the media images ignited the 
original spark which pushed Clinton towards articulating "Lift and Strike." This strategy 
would be extremely successful in the campaign, but conversely so once Clinton entered 
office. Clinton had responded to media outcry by championing an activist policy. As 
Strobe suggests, it truly was a media induced policy change.^^^
The Media Muddies the Waters
Though the media may have ignited Clinton’s support of "Lift and Strike," it 
simultaneously also influenced actors, primarily the American public, to slow the 
administration’s drive towards Balkan intervention. Difficulties in critically interpreting 
the importance of Balkan history, an over-reliance on partisan sources, the need to place 
the complicated events in Bosnia into a framework which could be easily understood by 
the general public, and a determination to provide “balanced” reporting affected the way 
in which the media portrayed the war in Bosnia. Instead of allowing general public to 
reach its own conclusions about the events in Bosnia, the media portrayed many concepts 
with questionable accuracy, reinforcing Balkan stereotypes, and clouded rather than
Strobel, Late Brealdng Foreign Policy. 218.
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informed the public’s critical understanding of the war. The media’s failure is important: 
its portrayal of events in Bosnia could have contributed to the American public’s 
perception that an intervention in Bosnia would become a quagmire, and that each of the 
region’s ethnic groups were equally to blame for Yugoslavia’s dissolution. As a result, 
the American public had a strong aversion to unilateral intervention, a key factor in 
Clinton’s failure to implement "Lift and Strike."
In his work The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia. 1991-1995. James J. Sadkovich 
undertook a comprehensive examination of the media’s role in the Yugoslav wars and 
suggested that, though it did become more sympathetic to the Bosnian position as the war 
dragged on, during this period the media often failed to understand and report the 
conflict’s most important nuances, ultimately making its portrayal of the fighting 
inaccurate. Many factors, including the need for journalists unfamiliar with recent 
Balkan history to meet competitive deadlines, and the dearth of unbiased sources, caused 
much of the reporting on Bosnia to be done without the sorts of stringent checks 
journalists typically use to validate the accuracy of their reporting. As Sadkovich 
suggests:
[The media] regularly reported information without checking it... repeated 
partisan accounts, and then ignored other explanations. Because most sources 
were Serbian politicians and military leaders or Western officials and officers, 
reporting tended to be biased. Efforts at historical explanation only made things 
worse, because most reporters lacked the time and loiowledge to construct 
nonpartisan historical accounts. Instead they relied on a few works in English, 
notably those by West, Djilas, Glenny, and Kaplan -  all biased towards Serbs or 
against Muslims and Croats.... Reporters uncritically repeated claims that the US 
had no vital interest in the Balkans, that there was no reasonable chance of 
success should outside military forces be sent to Bosnia,^^^
238 James J. Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia. 1991-1995 (London: Praeger: 1998) 39.
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Early conclusions formed from these sources created the foundation for many 
incorrect assumptions recycled by commentators and news anchors over the next several 
years. These included oft-repeated notions that the peoples of Yugoslavia were nothing 
more than “atavistic tribes,” that Serb atrocities could be justified as preventative 
retaliation for past and possible future Muslim and Croat aggression, that the conflict 
constituted a “civil war,” that the fact that Serb guerrilla fighters had successfully 
withstood attacks from Hitler’s fiercest fighters during World War II signaled that 
modem militaries would meet the same fate, and that America had no national interest in 
finding a solution to the fighting.
Further media failures resulted from attempts to compensate for ignorance by 
remaining even-handed while portraying the various factions fighting in the Balkans.^^^ 
However, as Sadkovich and others have suggested, “to not take sides was to eschew 
a c c u r a c y . I n  that the media and Western intellectuals refused to talce more overt 
efforts to assign blame for the destmction of Bosnia, they confused victim and aggressor, 
thus allowing proponents of neo-isolationism to argue that there had been guilt on all 
sides without differentiating war crimes from genocide, or weighing the degree of guilt of 
the various crimes. "^^  ^ Further, the media weighed historical events too heavily when 
explaining the roots of the contemporary conflict. For example, daily accounts of 
Serbian atrocities in The New York Times were often accompanied by short recaps of 
Croatia’s World War II crimes against the Serbs. These sort of rationalizations employed 
the same intergenerational guilt that the Serbs used in their propaganda, and only 
strengthened the American public’s conception that the Balkans were a “morass of
Power, A Problem From Hell. 268. 
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Mestrovié and Cushman, “Introduction,” 23.
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ancient hatreds” where no solution could be found to stop the fighting?"^^ Treating 
accused Serbian war criminals with sympathy and deference while allowing them a 
forum to make their arguments directly to the American people during television 
interviews only reinforced the notion that the culpability for destroying Bosnia was 
spread evenly among the ethnic groups?"^  ^ Even David Binder, who filed many 
important stories on the Bosnia conflict for The New York Times, refused to criticize 
indicted war criminal Ratko Mladic before there was greater proof of his guilt, calling 
him “professional.” '^^ '^  As a result, with few journalists willing or able to assign guilt to 
any of the Balkan parties, much of the American public felt a partisan intervention was 
inappropriate and thus assumed that a negotiated settlement between the parties was the 
only path to peace in the region?"^^
While the effect of this inaccuracy was to obscure the public’s perception of the 
Balkan conflict, this was certainly not the intention of many of the journalists reporting in 
Bosnia. The inaccuracy resulted as much fiom the Bosnians’ failure to report their 
version of events quickly as it did fiom the fact that the Serbs, inasmuch as they 
controlled most of Bosnia and all of the rump Yugoslavia, had the quickest and most 
direct access to news outlets. Thus, it was often the Serbian version of events which first 
found its way into the public domain through spokesmen like Karadzic and Mladic. '^^^ 
Also, as most journalists were heavily restricted to Sarajevo, they tended to have greater 
access to information on events in the besieged city than on the fighting in the
MeStrovic and Cushman, “Introduction,” 25.
MeStrovié and Cushman, “Introduction,” 24-5.
David Binder, New York Review of Books. 21 December 1995: 85. 
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countryside?"^^ As a result, journalists often reported with sympathy and greater accuracy 
towards the Bosnian position when covering events in Sarajevo, only to repeat Serb 
reports of Muslim atrocities when describing events in the countryside secondhand, 
further contributing to the American public’s perception that culpability for the 
destruction of Bosnia was spread evenly among the parties. Unable to independently 
confirm accounts of atrocities by both sides, many journalists resorted to disseminating 
information almost strictly through the passive voice, or repeating reports that the 
obvious slaughter of Muslims by Serbs may have actually been the work of Muslims -  an 
oft-repeated theory periodically reinforced by UN officials wishing to deflect blame for 
having not intervened during a genocide.^"^^
As a result of these patterns of reporting, much of the American public remained 
confused and ambivalent about the fighting in the Balkans more than a year after the 
conflict began. "^^  ^ In turn, this confusion and ambivalence had the important effect of 
reducing popular support for a unilateral intervention in Bosnia. The failure to gain 
public support for such an intervention is essential to understanding the Clinton 
Administration’s decision to abandon the "Lift and Strike" policy by May 1993.
American Public Opinion, the Media, and Unilateral Intervention
V. O. Key, a political theorist who considered the impact of American public 
opinion on foreign policy more than forty years ago, likened the views of the public to a 
“system of dykes” and suggested that although these attitudes did not themselves set
Strobel. Late Brealdng Foreign Policy. 212.
^  Sadkovich, The U.S. Media. 85.
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policy, public opinion did tend to guide and constrain the policymaking process?^® Other 
scholars reached a similar conclusion when they suggested that while mass opinion may 
not cause policymakers to choose a specific policy, it does set the parameters of 
acceptable alternatives by “ruling out” one or more p o l i c i e s I n  terms of America’s 
Bosnia policy, other scholars were more specific, arguing that the American public 
constrained, but did not set, America’s intervention policy
The work of these theorists is instructive when considering the impact of 
American public opinion on the Clinton Administration’s "Lift and Strike" policy. While 
American public opinion was never the primary determinant in setting the 
administration’s policy, it constrained the parameters under which the US could have 
intervened in the Balkans, in that while many Americans supported a multilateral 
inteiwention in Bosnia, there was never strong support for unilateral American action in 
the Balkans. This prevailing reluctance for unilateral intervention, partly the product of 
the media’s portrayal of the Balkan conflict, was powerful deterrent against intervention.
Richard Sobel analyzed various public opinion polls, conducted throughout the 
war in Bosnia, of Americans’ attitudes toward a possible intervention in the Balkans, and 
revealed several telling statistics. At no time in 1993 was there a majority support for 
unilateral intervention, with no more than 27% of those surveyed supporting such action 
at any one time, and with the average percentage far closer to 12-15%.^^^ However, 
when suggestions of multilateral intervention were made, support climbed to over 60% in
V. O. Key, Jr. Public Opinion and American Democracy. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), as cited 
in Sobel, Impact. 1.
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most polls?^"  ^ This probably has much to do with the fact that more than 80% of 
Americans surveyed felt that primary responsibility for stopping the conflict lay with the 
Europeans and the UN, and that if  the Europeans refused to participate in an intervention, 
the US should not take unilateral military action to stop the fighting?^^ In other words, 
Americans tended to be supportive of intervention in conjunction with the European 
allies or the NATO alliance, but ambivalent towards unilateral action.
If one searches deeper into the surveys o f American opinion, statistics suggest a 
relationship between the failure of the American media to paint a complete and 
consistently accurate picture of the events in the Balkans, and the American public’s 
resistance to unilateral intervention. First, when questioned whether the US should 
intervene to stop the “civil war” as opposed to the “fighting” in the Balkans, a greater 
than 20% margin opposed intervention in a “civil war.”^^  ^ The media often incorrectly 
referred to the conflict in the Balkans as a “civil war,” and as these suiweys showed that a 
large number of respondents supported an intervention to stop “fighting” but rejected the 
notion of intervening in a “civil war,” it seems that many Americans may have been 
swayed away fiom intervention by the media’s portrayal of the conflict as a “civil war.” 
The media’s consistent portrayal of the Serbs as “invincible guenilla fighters” also may 
have had a strong effect on many Americans opinions of an intervention. While a 
majority of respondents supported the use of American troops for use in a multilateral 
force designed to protect the delivery of food and humanitarian supplies to besieged 
towns, that number fell more than 20% when the wording was changed to using the
^  Sobel, “Trends,” 267. 
Sobel, “Trends,” 264.
These two surveys were conducted within one week of each other in April 1993. Sobel, “Trends ” 268- 
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military to “stop the Serbs” from blocking the delivery of those supplies?^^ In another 
examination, more than 60% of Americans surveyed believed that the roots of the 
conflict in Bosnia stretched “hundreds of years” into the past?^* Even more troubling for 
proponents of a unilateral intervention against the Serbs, 45% believed that no one ethnic 
group could be directly blamed for the destruction of Bosnia, though more than 40% also 
held the Serbs responsible?^^
These findings suggest that had the conflict seemed less intractable, had the Serbs 
seemed less militarily invincible, and had more Americans held the Serbs directly 
responsible for the carnage in the Balkans, there may have been greater support for 
unilateral intervention on the side of the Bosnians. With Americans being consistently 
told that the roots of the conflict stretched far into the past, without a consensus of 
opinion that the Serbs were culpable, with the notion of the Serbs fighter as being 
“invincible” oft-repeated by pundits and commentators, the waters were sufficiently 
muddied to slow a consensus of public opinion towards unilateral intervention. The 
media’s portrayal of the conflict showed the Balkans as a region in where war, hatred, 
and atrocity were pandemic, and no outside party could assume to bring peace. And even 
though Americans consistently supported a multilateral intervention in the Balkans, 
America’s European allies would never support such action; thus without overwhelming 
support for a unilateral American intervention, Clinton found himself restricted by public 
opinion in the very way V.O. Key had suggested almost thirty years earlier.
Sobel, “Trends” 264, 267.
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Ciinton and the Power of Public Opinion
A direct linlc can be found between the American public’s strong distaste for a 
unilateral Balkan intervention and the Clinton Administration’s eventual decision to 
abandon the "Lift and Strike" policy. As was explained in Chapter 3, the stance of 
America’s allies with troops in LTNPRGFOR was clear: any move by the US to lift the 
arms embargo against the Bosnians followed by air strikes against the Serbs would result 
in the withdrawal of the European troops stationed in Bosnia. This action would, in 
effect, put the US in the position of embarking on a unilateral intervention; a policy for 
which the American people had clearly had no stomach. Further, as was explained in 
Chapter 4, the stance of Congressional leaders was that any American intervention would 
have to be successful and that failed foreign adventurism would not smooth the passage 
of Clinton’s expansive domestic policy agenda. With the combination of these factors, 
American public opinion became a key component of the Clinton Administration’s 
decision to abandon "Lift and Strike.” If Europe withdrew following the commencement 
of "Lift and Strike,” America would be embarking on the exact sort of unilateral 
intervention which its people did not support. While Clinton pollster Stan Greenberg felt 
that Americans would initially rally around the president’s decision, even in the case of a 
unilateral intervention, a failure to end the conflict quickly could be disastrous to 
Clinton’s standing.^^® Dovetailed with the Congressional stance that any intervention 
must be successful, and that Clinton could not retreat following a failure to calm the 
conflict, it was quite possible that Clinton’s decision to embark on the "Lift and Strike" 
policy could engage the US in a war from which it would be difficult to withdraw; the 
very sort of quagmire that skeptics of a Balkan intervention feared. A decision that so
Melanson, American Foreign Policy. 258.
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greatly risked launching the US into a complicated foreign war from which it could not 
easily escape seemed politically foolish, especially while most American’s seemed to 
approve of Clinton’s handling of America’s Balkans policy during the first months of his 
presidency?^^ American public opinion had acted as a “series of dykes,” limiting the 
options available to America’s policy makers. However, nothing would limit America’s 
intervention in the Balkans more than Clinton’s determination to initiate the most 
expansive domestic agenda since the New Deal.
261 Sobel, “Trends,” 263.
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Chapter 4 -  The Office of the President
Bosnia and the Risk to Clinton *s Policy Goals 
This chapter examines how the prioritization of Clinton’s domestic policy goals 
contributed to the decision to abandon “Lift and Strike.” While a levels of analysis 
approach often uses its most focused examination to explore how an individual’s 
psychology, personality, and belief structures influence a decision, this work uses this 
chapter to understand how Clinton’s domestic policy goals and the genesis of his Bosnia 
stance led to the abandonment of intervention. Though psychology and belief structures 
in some manner inform every decision a leader makes, at its core the abandonment of 
"Lift and Strike" was influenced most not by personality, but after a consideration of 
policy. Thus, to complete this understanding, this work uses this chapter in an 
untraditional manner to focus on how Clinton’s policy goals and the stances of the other 
actors examined influenced the administration’s decision.
It shows how Clinton’s campaign strategy and domestic policy priorities 
influenced the formulation of both his Bosnia policy and his decision to abandon “Lift 
and Strike.” Each of these factors would play a major role in determining how his 
administration would approach the conflict in the Balkans, but in the end it would be the 
prioritization of domestic primacy which would do the most to derail the policy. In order 
to prove his ability in the foreign policy arena, Clinton articulated a more activist Bosnia 
policy than President Bush during the 1992 campaign, but was not prepared to execute 
the strategy when the true costs of intervention were revealed. The upcoming 
Congressional struggles over Clinton’s ambitious domestic policy agenda required the
118
entirety of his presidential political capital, and thus he could not use his influence to gain 
the public’s support for a risky multilateral Balkans intervention. The cost of the "Lift 
and Strike" policy only increased when the LINPROFOR threatened to abandon Bosnia if 
the US lifted the arms embargo and bombed the Serbs, as America would be left with 
unilateral responsibility for calming the Balkan conflict. This outcome would have put 
Clinton at odds with both the US Congress and the public, neither of which supported a 
unilateral intervention into Bosnia. Such conflict would have sunk Clinton’s domestic 
agenda, and possibly his presidency, as support from these two groups was absolutely 
vital for Clinton to achieve his domestic policy goals.
Clmton, Bosnia, and the 1992 Campaign
Clinton’s criticism of the Bush Administration’s Balkans policy during the 1992 
presidential campaign was instrumental in formulating his administration’s initial stance 
on American policy for Bosnia. Under attack from Bush Administration officials who 
claimed that Clinton lacked the vision and experience to lead American policy in the 
foreign arena, Clinton used Bush’s weak response to the reports o f Serbian ethnic 
cleansing in August 1992 as an opportunity to articulate a stronger Balkans policy. 
However, created during the heat of a presidential campaign, the precursor to the "Lift 
and Strike" policy was the result o f overheated campaign rhetoric, and created unrealistic 
expectations for an activist policy. In articulating his activist policy for the Balkans, 
Clinton would break two of his predecessor’s most important guiding principles: do not 
make the US responsible for a problem it cannot solve and make no threat that the US
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cannot execute?^^
The Bush Administration attempted to raise doubts about Clinton’s ability to 
manage America’s foreign policy throughout much o f the 1992 campaign, adopting a 
similar tactic to the one used against Michael Dukalds in 1988, though the pace of these 
criticisms quickened once Ross Perot withdrew from the race?^^ Early criticisms of 
Clinton’s statements on Bosnia claimed he was “a closet dove masquerading as a hawk, 
and that his experience in world affairs is limited to breakfast at the International House 
of Pancakes.”^^ '^  Prominent Republican stiategist Eddie Mahe would mock that Clinton 
has “zero, and I underscore zero” background in foreign p o l i c y H i s  detractors scoffed 
at his credentials for formulating a post-Cold War foreign policy, and criticized his 
viewpoint’s broad combination of oft-competing ideologies, from idealism to 
pragmatism, from internationalism to protectionism, claiming the governor’s foreign 
policy was a combination of these differing ideas “because he wanted to be all things to 
all men and had not really made up his mind.”^^  ^ Every Democratic presidential 
candidate in Clinton’s adult life, save Jimmy Carter, had been defeated in large part 
because they “were perceived to be unwilling to use force to confront the Soviets in 
various regions around the globe and because they were too willing to cut the military 
budget.”^^  ^ Thus, in order to defeat a Republican president with a strong foreign policy 
record, it was necessary for Clinton to show his capacity in the foreign arena, prove that
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he was not a dove unwilling to commit troops to combat, and reveal unnoticed 
weaknesses in Bush’s foreign policies, hopefully undermining his opponent’s major area 
of strength. In August 1992, following the international outcry resulting fi om the Bush 
Administration’s muted response to media reports of Nazi-style camps in Bosnia, Clinton 
took aim at Bush’s policy for the Balkans, articulated a notably tougher American 
approach to the Balkans.
“If the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining 
silent and paralyzed in the face of genocide. We must discover who is responsible for 
these actions and take steps to bring them to justice for these crimes against humanity,” 
Clinton would announce.^^^ Such rhetoric was supported by policy proposals which 
marked a radical departure from Bush’s hands-off Balkans approach. Clinton prodded 
Bush to show “real leadership” in the Balkans, and called for American and European 
navy ships stationed in the Adriatic to search vessels headed for Serbia which might be 
carrying contraband.^^^ As well, straying far from the Bush Administration’s policy, 
Clinton suggested the use of military might, including American air power, against the 
Serbs. “The US should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for air 
strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort. The US should be prepared to 
lend appropriate military support to that operation. Air and naval forces adequate to 
carry out these operations should be visibly in position.”^^® Clinton, who had already 
made clear that if  elected he would be willing to commit forces to a multilateral operation 
to “shoot its way in” to the Sarajevo airport to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the 
beleaguered city, would later make clear that he believed the US should use militaiy
268 Krauss, “US Backs Away,” 5 August 1992.
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force to open the Serbian detention camps and consider lifting the arms embargo on the 
former republics of Bosnia and Croatia?^^ The Bush Administration attempted to handle 
these attacks by painting Clinton as a foreign policy neophyte unfit to manage the 
complex issues of the international arena. “It sounds like the kind of reckless approach 
that indicates he better do some more homework on foreign policy. It’s clear he’s 
unaware of the political complications in Yugoslavia,” White House spokesman Marlin 
Fitzwater would say.^^^
In the short term space of the 1992 political campaign, Clinton’s attacks were 
successful, as he convinced m any voters to be what the Republicans had long maintained 
he was not: presidential in both the domestic and foreign arenas. Nevertheless, over the 
longer term, Clinton’s attacks on Bush’s record would set dangerous expectations of 
quick and decisive action in the Balkans he would be unable to meet. Even the Clinton 
Administration’s first pronouncements on American policy for the Balkans made clear 
that no calculation of the costs of intervention had been made. When asked to explain the 
specific steps the administration would take to create a Balkans policy which reflected 
Clinton’s tough campaign rhetoric, Warren Christopher could say only that in Bosnia he 
had inherited “one of the most difficult foreign policy problems that can be imagined,” 
and that he was still “gathering data.” One commentator scoffed that it was as if  
Churchill had entered office in 1940 announcing that the German problem was more 
complex than had been anticipated.^^^ In fact, as complicated as the Balkans question 
was, the greatest challenge Christopher faced was rectifying the gap between the policies
271 For Sarajevo airport, see Apple et al,, “Excerpts from Interview with Clinton,” 28 June 1992. For 
detention camps and arms embargo, see Ifill, “Clinton Takes Aggressive Stance,” 10 August 1992.
272 Rosenthal, “Clinton Attacked,” 27 July 1992.
273 Jonathan Clarke, “Rhetoric Before Reality,” Foreign Affairs 74.5 (1995) 6.
122
articulated by the candidate on the campaign trail and the policies enacted by the 
president in office. In the case of America’s Bosnia policy, the gap was large, and 
affected the administration’s willingness to intervene in the Balkans through the first 
months of 1993.
Derailing "Lift and Strilce"
To analyze the role that Clinton played in the derailment of the "Lift and Strike" 
policy as the final arbitrator of any American foreign policy, one must understand how he 
viewed both his mandate and the risk that a failed Bosnia policy could pose to his 
domestic policy agenda. In turn, one may examine how the promise by America’s allies 
to withdraw their UNPROFOR troops and the low Congressional and public support for a 
unilateral intervention combined to threaten that domestic agenda. This allows a 
complete understanding on Clinton’s decision to abandon the policy.
Alleging early during the 1992 campaign that, “We have a president who last 
month met with the leaders of 21 nations, including Micronesia and Liechtenstein, and 
wouldn’t even meet with Republicans to discuss the economy,” Clinton made clear which 
issue he thought would resonate with voters most stroiigly.^^^ Thus, Clinton took his 
election as a mandate to devote most of his energy to domestic needs, which he saw as 
the greatest threat to America’s security.
Victory in the 1992 election also reaffirmed Clinton’s inclination that presidents 
rarely benefited firom even the most splendid foreign policy victories, as Bush’s approval
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ratings fell throughout his long string of foreign policy successes?^^ Clinton was of the 
opinion that no matter how much attention a president gave to foreign policy, failure in 
the domestic arena would spell political doom?^^ More importantly, he also believed that 
he had learned from Lyndon Johnson’s experience with Vietnam and Jimmy Carter’s 
with Iran that no matter how successful one’s domestic policy, foreign disasters would 
seal a president’s fate/^^ His advisers and fellow Democrats shared his view. Clinton’s 
renowned political adviser Dick Morris warned him of embarking on a risky Bosnia 
policy: “You don’t want to be LBJ and risk domestic policy for foreign policy.”^^  ^
Senator Tim Wirth (D-CO) cautioned that, “the best liberal hope in a generation,” could 
be dragged down by a failed intervention in the Balkans.^^® Even Arthur Schlesinger had 
counseled Clinton in the op-ed pages of The Wall Street Journal that failure in Bosnia 
could pose grave dangers to his domestic agenda.^^^ Such cautionary messages only 
reinforced Clinton’s natural inclination to preserve his political capital for his domestic 
policy, as voters rarely reward foreign policy s u c c e s s e s S u c h  fears that a failed 
foreign policy initiative could derail an expansive domestic agenda represent the Clinton 
strand of the Vietnam Syndrome, and owe much to the legacy of Lyndon Johnson’s 
Vietnam induced downfall.
Thus when one considers the low electoral mandate which resulted from the three 
way 1992 election results, Clinton’s expansive domestic agenda, his perception of the 
risk-reward ratio with which voters rewarded successful foreign policy ventures, and the
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legacy of Vietnam in Democratic policy circles, prioritizing Bosnia over the planks of his 
domestic policy platform seemed a poor policy choice. This accounts for why Clinton 
did not tackle the Bosnia issue during the first days of his presidency.^^^ While his stance 
on the importance o f foreign policy contributed to the abandonment of the "Lift and 
Strike" policy, to understand the decision completely, one must focus closely at the nexus 
between the Bosnia policy stances of America’s allies. Congress, and American public 
opinion.
The importance of Clinton’s domestic policy agenda has already been reviewed, 
as has the tenuous position in which he found himself in his dealings with Congress, 
whose support for his domestic agenda was critical. Further, it has also been shown that 
the American public, while sympathetic to the Bosnian cause, was unwilling to 
countenance a unilateral Balkans intervention. The allies had made clear their position, 
both before and after Christopher’s failed trip to Europe’s capitals, that any decision to 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo and use air power against the Serbs would result in the 
immediate withdrawal of their peacekeeping troops, leaving the US with sole 
responsibility for calming a conflict many military planners predicted could mire the 
American military in a Vietnam-styled military quagmire. Finally, while Congressional 
leaders would eventually give their guarded support for the "Lift and Stiike" policy, they 
had also made clear that once engaged, the US military could neither fail nor withdraw.
In the nexus between these factors, one finds a cleai' understanding of why the 
Clinton Administration abandoned its proposal to arm the Bosnians and use air power
283 Wliile he did assign his foreign policy triad with the task of performing a fhll-scale review of America’s 
Balkans policy upon entering office, he did not take part in this review, nor did he spur on his advisers 
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against the Serbs. The stances of the allies. Congress, and the public, combined with the 
primacy of Clinton’s domestic policy, are the most essential factors in understanding the 
abandonment of the policy. Had the Clinton Administration initiated its "Lift and Strike" 
policy, there is little doubt that France and Britain would have withdrawn their own 
troops, as neither of country had a vested national interest in assuring Bosnian peace, and 
had deployed their troops in order to maintain the face o f a united EC foreign policy. The 
US would then be given sole responsibility for calming a conflict using a strategy which 
most Pentagon planners had predicted would fail, in a region which threatened to 
entangle the US military in a quagmire. Further, the US would have embarked on a 
unilateral intervention against the wishes of American public opinion, whose support 
Clinton, who lacked an electoral mandate, desperately needed to buttress his attempts to 
press his domestic policy through Congress. Congress, whose support for Clinton’s 
domestic reforms was even more essential, had already made clear that it would not allow 
America’s credibility to be tarnished by a withdrawal from Bosnia without victory, even 
if  this position granted America unilateral responsibility for bringing peace to the 
Balkans. Further, i f  the US was either forced to withdraw prematurely or was mired in a 
military quagmire, Clinton’s political credibility and standing in Congress, both of which 
would be essential for pushing his domestic agenda through the legislative body, would 
be negated.
Clinton would then have ignored the lessons o f the previous two Democratic 
administrations, both of which saw their domestic policy agendas derailed by a foreign 
policy failure. He would have inherited responsibility for a conflict in the Balkans, 
against an enemy whose fanaticism and fighting skill would later be discredited, but who
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at that moment enjoyed an almost mythical portrayal in the Western media as an 
invincible fighting force. The deployment would not have enjoyed support of a military 
which was already distrustful and contemptuous of Clinton, and with whom a positive 
working relationship would be almost impossible with the poor appointment of Aspin to 
the office of secretary. Such a deployment would have also been an expensive luxury 
that a president, whose entire campaign had centered around economic renewal, could not 
afford.
Thus, taken together, these factors suggested that a failed intervention put 
Clinton’s domestic agenda at grave risk. Already defeated by Congress over a policy 
proposal, gays in the military, which was relatively unimportant to the administration’s 
broader goals, Clinton had also seen his attempts at passing his stimulus package through 
Congress thwarted. On the horizon for a president whose entire campaign and expertise 
centered around domestic goals were the three greatest, and perhaps most controversial, 
aspects of his policy agenda: the budget package, NAFTA, and health care. His standing 
in Congress was wealc upon his inauguration, and the failures over gays in the military 
and the stimulus package, combined with the successive embarrassments over his illegal- 
nanny-hiring attorney general appointees, only further eroded his standing with the body. 
A unilateral failure in the Balkans would have so eroded Clinton’s popularity with the 
public, in essence disconnecting the “transmission belt” between a president’s popularity 
and his legislative clout in Congress, that his expansive domestic agenda would have 
been grounded before he had made any substantive attempts to push it through the 
legislature. Even without an unpopular Balkans intervention, Clinton failed to pass his 
health care proposal, and while he succeeded in pushing both NAFTA and the budget
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package through Congress, he did so only by a razor sharp margin and after an intensive 
lobbying effort, the granting of political favors, and, in the case of NAFTA, over a large 
uprising from within his own party. In essence, if Clinton had initiated the "Lift and 
Strike" policy, unless there had been a quick Serb capitulation (which, ironically, 
considering the dramatic events of the summer of 1995, actually seems to have been a 
distinct possibility) a failure in the Balkans really would have derailed Clinton’s domestic 
agenda. In fact, after comparing the support both Carter and Johnson enjoyed in 
Congress and the popularity of their respective domestic agendas with their Democratic 
bases to Clinton’s deficiencies in these areas, one may conclude that a foreign policy 
crisis could have made Clinton’s fall even more meteoric than his predecessors’. 
Considering the damage that a foreign policy had on their agendas, one can only imagine 
the effect of a disastrous Bosnia policy on Clinton’s agenda.
Thus Clinton’s domestic agenda was the greatest impediment to plans to intervene 
in the Balkans. While Congress, the Pentagon, the allies, and public opinion contributed 
to the final decision to abandon "Lift and Strike,” none actually acted directly to 
discourage the administration’s policy. Instead, they increased the risk a failed Bosnia 
policy could pose to the domestic agenda, and it is only because of the primacy of 
Clinton’s domestic platform that this risk in turn stalled plans for intervention. For 
example, the allies did not threaten to defend the Serbs militarily, they merely threatened 
to withdraw their troops if intervention occurred. It was the cost of an unpopular 
unilateral intervention which gave the allied policy such weight in Clinton’s decision­
making calculus. As well, the administration was not limited by the bipartisan group of 
Congressional leaders who gave their tentative support to "Lift and Strike" in May 1993.
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Instead, the administration limited itself when Congress made the costs of a failed 
intervention clear, prioritizing fulfillment of its domestic agenda over Balkan 
intervention. While each of these actors had a strong effect on the administration’s 
eventual decision, that effect was predicated on the prioritization of the domestic agenda. 
One can only imagine that had had a similar threat been made over NAFTA, Clinton 
would have accepted the risk in light of the administration’s priorities.
Finally, for all of the damage America’s failures in the Balkans would cause to its 
standing during the first years o f Clinton’s presidency, and for all of the risk the failure to 
quell the fighting in the Balkans would eventually pose to Clinton’s foreign policy 
legacy, and, indeed, to his Presidency, when one considers the genesis of Clinton’s tough 
rhetoric on Bosnia in terms of his domestic policy agenda, the reasoning for the decision 
to abandon "Lift and Strike" is even more clear. Made in the heat of the 1992 
presidential campaign, the motivation for Clinton’s tough Balkans policy was first and 
foremost to act as a foil for Bush’s strong foreign policy legacy. The purpose of that foil 
was to strengthen Clinton’s standing so that he could strengthen his candidacy, become 
elected, and proceed to work on America’s domestic policy. Thus, much like the 
European decision to deploy its UNPROFOR troops in defense of European unity, the 
genesis of Clinton’s activist Bosnia policy owed more to domestic and electoral 
considerations than the formulation of a sound foreign policy. It is unsurprising that with 
the first signs of danger, the Europeans threatened to withdraw UNPROFOR, and in the 
earliest sign that "Lift and Strike" risked the domestic agenda, Clinton abandoned the 
effort to push it forward. Clinton had run for president on a platfonn of domestic 
renewal, risking that agenda to press a risky foreign policy initiative which had been
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originally designed to bolster his candidacy so that he may one day attempt to initiate that 
domestic agenda would have lacked all logic. As a result, the "Lift and Strike" was 
abandoned for more than two years, until NATO revived aspects of it, with great success 
one might add, two years later.
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Conclusion
Employing a levels of analysis approach allows a unique, and arguably more 
complete, view of the administration’s policy shift. While Clinton’s domestic policy 
primacy was the most important influence on his plans to intervene in Bosnia, through 
their various connections to the administration’s domestic agenda and America’s foreign 
policy apparatus each of the other actors studied played a part in pushing the 
administration away from "Lift and Strike.” As a result, without examining the various 
other actors which influenced the president, it would have been impossible to understand 
how Clinton’s domestic agenda played such a large role in determining his foreign 
policy. An uneasy cohabitation of a strong domestic agenda and an Balkans intervention 
is not automatic. It is through the levels of analysis approach that the connections 
between the risk Bosnia posed to Clinton’s domestic goals and an intervention in the 
Balkans is made clear.
Clinton had run on a platform promising to focus on American domestic policy, 
but had also made clear his plans to intervene in the Balkans. Had he entered office 
announcing his determination to proceed in both directions, there is little reason to 
believe that this decision would have surprised the American public. Both policies would 
have been consistent with his intentions articulated during the campaign. However, 
Clinton’s presidency began with misstep after misstep, empowering critics in both the 
Congress and Pentagon to resist various aspects of his agenda. It became clear that 
passing that domestic platfoim would require a great deal of direct presidential attention. 
This fact alone would make a difficult Balkans intervention less desirable, but it was only 
after the true costs, and risks, of intervention became clear that saving the Bosnians was
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no longer an important priority.
While it was Clinton and his dedication to the domestic agenda which would act 
as the final factor derailing "Lift and Strike,” it is important to understand that a Balkans 
intervention did not threaten the agenda per se. The other actors studied in this work 
threatened the domestic agenda in that their various stances on intervention, combined 
with the inherent risks in any military operation, promised to make conditions difficult 
for the passage of the domestic agenda if  intervention went failed. Considering the 
extreme skepticism of the Pentagon experts who testified in Congress about the 
probability that "Lift and Strike” would succeed, it is clear why the administration felt 
intervention to be such a risk.
Each of these actors increased the risk a failed intervention could pose to the 
domestic agenda. Congress was already a difficult partner for Clinton. He had no natural 
policy coalition on Capitol Hill, and no member of Congiess felt they owed him his or 
her position in government. The bungled honeymoon period had already shown 
legislators the ease of resisting the Clinton agenda. When Congressional leaders later 
gave their guarded blessing to "Lift and Strike,” they also made the costs to the 
president’s stature clear were an intervention to fail. It would be hard to imagine Clinton 
would have remained an effective policy entrepreneur had his stature with the Congress 
decreased following a Balkan failure, and administration officials must have understood 
this point. Congress had made clear that an intervention could not fail, while the allies 
had made clear that any intervention would give the US sole responsibility for solving the 
Balkan conflict. Combined with the public antipathy towards a unilateral intervention, 
Clinton’s difficult decision becomes easier to understand.
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If the US intervened in Bosnia, and the Pentagon, which had several reasons to 
resist the new president, was correct in their estimates o f the high risk to American 
troops, Clinton could have found America at war less than 150 days into his presidency. 
Following the allied withdrawal, the US would have lone responsibility for calming this 
conflict, a fact which would have drained a great deal o f Clinton’s public support, 
especially amongst those who voted for him with the understanding that he would focus 
on the domestic agenda more than his predecessor had. With Congress view towards 
inteivention, a failed intervention would have damned the presidency.
Clinton would have locked himself into an intervention from which he could not 
escape, for which there was no public support, without allied help, and which failed to 
represent an identifiable thieat to America’s national interest. The public support he 
required to buttress his agenda goals in an already hostile Congress would have eroded.
It is possible that he would have failed to achieve every major goal of his presidency 
were an intervention in Bosnia to have turned sour. It is with this view towards his policy 
goals that Clinton opted to abandon the "Lift and Strike" policy.
This decision by Clinton invites several observations. While politically 
understandable at the time, the decision to reject intervention would have lasting effects. 
First, Clinton’s ability to lead on the world stage would be questioned until the victory of 
Balkan peace three years later in Dayton, especially after the debacles in Haiti and 
Somalia. In fact, one can argue that while these still would have been very serious events 
indeed, had Clinton already ordered a successful military intervention in the Balkans, the 
failures may not have given Clinton the reputation as a weak custodian of US power.
Second, by 1995, his foreign policy record had become such a target for his
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political enemies that a failure in Dayton could have been fatal to Clinton’s 1996 
reelection bid. The policy triad which had attempted to protect Clinton’s domestic 
agenda by steering him away from an activist foreign policy did not protect the agenda 
forever. Instead, they deferred the risk until the Bosnia issue had grown so acute that it 
threatened to swallow his entire presidency. In that they failed to realize that the essential 
protection of Clinton’s expansive domestic agenda could only be achieved by attacking 
the Bosnia cancer as early as possible, before it spread, they failed him in their advisory 
role.
Third, when intervention finally did come in 1995, it was swift and easy. There is 
little reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs were even a fraction of the military 
machine many had predicted them to be. While the Pentagon’s leaders were reacting to 
poor political decisions made a generation earlier, during the last great American 
intervention in Vietnam, it is impossible to ignore how incorrect their predictions were in 
this instance. Had they been more accurate, or not guilty of inflating the risks posed by 
intervention as many suspected, intervention would have seemed a clear choice. Had 
resistance to American forces melted during the first days of US air strikes, and had the 
Bosnians been able to quickly regain their military losses, public resistance to the 
unilateral nature of intervention would have been fleeting, and Clinton could have gained 
support for the intervention once the ease of the mission became clear. While he might 
not have gained political capital from the policy, he might have been able to continue his 
push for the domestic agenda with little interruption.
Each of these actors helped to create the conditions in which a failed "Lift and 
Strike" policy threatened the domestic agenda. Like any president, Clinton was forced to
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examine the competing interests which governed every decision his administration made. 
In doing so, Clinton had to weigh the consequences of failed Balkans policy against the 
ramifications of a failed domestic agenda. Clinton was elected on a domestic policy 
platform, and the risks in Bosnia seemed high. Considering the stances of many actors 
on whom he relied to achieve that domestic agenda, Clinton’s decision to abandon the 
"Lift and Strike" policy was an unfortunate one, but was a function of the policy position 
in which he found himself by May 1993.
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